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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Man Himself 
Early Life . John De ey . was born October 20, 1859, 
in Burlington, Vermont. The ancestor of both his 
parents came to this country among the first settlers 
in the s vent nth century . Hi father, a local merchant 
in Burlington, was also during the Civil War a captain of 
a Vermont regim nt. He was a man of l i terary tastes and 
of practical business ability. 
Education . His boyhood surroundings played a large 
part in forming John Dewey's ducational theories. H 
graduated from high school at the age of 15 but had found 
school boring . He went to the University of Vermont and 
graduated four years later. It was under Professor G. H. 
Perkins in geology that he accepted evolution . 
I was brought up in a conventionally evangelical 
atmosphere of the more "liberal" sort ••• and the 
struggles that later arose between acceptance of 
that faith and the dis carding ot tradi tional and 
institutional creeds came from personal exp~riences 
and not from the effects ot philosophic 1 te~ohing.l 
Teaching. D wey spent three years teaching, then 
spent one year in the private study of philosophy with 
Professor Torrey of the University of Vermont . In 1882 
he went to John Hopkins where he studied philosophy and 
psychology with Professor George s . Morris and G. Stanley 
1. Adams, {ea.), CAP , 15-16. 
2 
Hall. 
Philosophical Development. Dr . Morris as on of 
t he few ph losophers at that time in America 1ho was not 
a churchman. Morris had reacted against the religious 
orthodoxy of the puritanic New England and Dewey followed 
in this rebellion. It was from Professor Norris 's teach-
ing that Dewey first became acquainted with the Hegelian 
viewpoint. Dewey follow d the leadership of Dr . Morris 
and becam a Hegelian. 
orris's influence could be seen not only in Dewey 's 
Hegelian ideas but also in the field of logic. Morris 
had called real logic the logic associated with Hegel 
and Aristotle , but had a low opinion of formal logic. It 
was from these b sic ideas that Dewey developed an inter-
mediate logic.2 
G. Stanley Hall .' influence on psychological topics 
led Dewey to th belief that psychology and philosophy' 
were intimately connected togeth r. Experience as ov r -
throwing the older rational psychology. The "ambition 
to help bring an alliance of the new psychology with 
philosophy was deviating D wey's intellectual activity 
to a greater extent than he realized."3 He received his 
2 . D w y, Art .(l939), 18. 
3. Schilpp (ed.), PJD, 23. 
3 
Ph.D. degre in 1884, writing his thesis on "The Psychology 
of Kant . tt This degree was from John Hopkins UnivAraity. 
In 1884 he became instructor in philo ophy in the 
Univer ity of Michigan, going there with Profe sor orris. 
He mar r ied Alice Chipman in June 1886 and she was largely 
responsible for the "early idening of Dewey's philosophiC 
1nt rests from the comm ntati e and classical to the fiel4 
of contemporary life.'4 She believed that religion was 
necessary for human experience but that ecclesiastical 
institutions wer not. 
It was while John Dewey was t Ann Arbor with orris 
that his philosophical position came clos st to the German 
objective i dealism. It w s his work in psycholo y nd 
instrumental logic that gradually undermined the dominant 
position of Ger.man thought. As he broke with Hegelian 
idealism he launched his instrumental th ory of r fleotive 
thought . 
illiam James influenced De ey primaril through 
chapt ra in the Principles of Psychology. The influence 
of George H. Mead ranked along ith James. ead was a 
gr at scholar and had emph sized the relationship bet een 
t he individual and his form tion and te t inga of hypothe-
sis as over again t th Hegelian view of society as an 
4. Schilpp ( d.}. PJD, 21 . 
4 
organism. Meed's greates t influence as in psychology. 
Some have considered Mesdto belong to no particular 
school of philosophy, but it is more common to associate 
him with the pragmatic school . 
Fr om 1894 to 1904 Dewey headed the Department of 
Psychol ogy, Philosophy, and Education at the University of 
Chicago . While there he shifted from undergraduate teach-
ing to gr duete t aching . While in Chicago he was greatl y 
influ need by rs . Ella Flagg Young, District Superintend-
ent of Schools in Chicago, in th field of educat on . 
Dewey even tod y reg rd Mr • Young as the wisest person 
in the field of education that he has ever come in contact 
w1th . 5 
During De ey's 1 t ye r at the Universtty of Chicago 
ther 
1:c..,,,_:, .,.e, n,.,,;., 
had b en !ncr aaing matters connected with the ,.. ad-
mini tration of the laboratory school. He left the Uni-
versity in 1904, since Dewey felt that he could no longer 
work 1n harmony with the pr sident . From the University 
of Chic go he ent t Columbia where he foun a ne spirit--
the 9 irit of realism . 
2. The Problem 
Statement of the problem. It is the purpose of this 
study to consider the epistemology of John Dewey as it has 
5 . Sch1lpp (ed.), PJD, 29 . 
I 
5 
dev loped, to se his pre ent epistemological position and 
to sho the relation of De ey's epistemology to the other 
oont mporary theorie of p1stemology. 
Importance of the study. John Dewey is undoubtedly 
the most influe ttal living merican philosopher . To under-
stand John D wey's philosophy and particularly his views on 
educat on, one must under tand his theory of kno ledge. 
John D way's epistemology is the ba~ie foundation of the 
educational pro ram in Am rica today. Not only is owey 
influ ntial n education but he is the representative of 
the pragmatic school of philosophy in merioa. "Instru-
mentalism" nd ttprogre siva education" are two terms that 
ha~ beoome common in America due to Dewey's influence. 
Science o ea the logical recording of its method of proce-
dur to John De y. Dr. De ey set forth the scientific 
method which has become th b ic scientific approach to a 
problem. In the field of logic De ey stands ith the few 
great men uc as ristotle, Bacon, an Hegel . De ey•s 
influ nee can b tr ced in almost every field of kno ledge . 
3. Organizatipn of the Problem 
In con ider tion of th problem t o approaches may 
b used. The first i the dis tinctly historical method. 
Using th a proach one ould consider and analyze very-
thing De ey had held to during one period of his life . This 
method ba es it work anrt teaching upon the facta shown by 
historical res earch and the inductions drawn from them. It may di -
6 
vide a person's life into periods. After a period had been studied 
t hen one would pass on to the next period of his life. 
Thus a ole r picture would be given of De ey's vie s in 
each period . 
There ar everal disadvantages to an approach lik 
this. hen on divides man's thought up into different 
historical units, it becomes difficult to grasp the picture 
of the whole. The historical units are considered separ-
tely and thus there is of necessity a break between th 
different units. Th a 1 ads to a lack of coherence and 
balance. en do not suddenly change from on view to another 
but how a radual change or evolution in their thinking. 
ith the historical aporoach it is impossible to show tl~s 
gradual develonment. This a roach is not the b t one to 
use in tudy of the epist mology of John Dewey. 
Th econ approach would be to consider each problem 
and trace its development . Thus one is able to grasp a 
picture of the whole and establi h a coherent view . By 
sho ing the development of th problem the historical ap -
proach is used . The most valid objection is that this 
method tend to destroy the unity between the problems that 
exist in the historical ap roach . What a person believes 
about onA subject effects what he believes about another 
subject. By tracing e ch problem out t he historical 1nter-
relationsh1 s are lost. This can be partly overcome by the 
7 
author's attempting to present these interrelationships . 
Granting t ha t both approaches have their good and bad points 
it seems ise t to dAvelop a synthesis of both approaches. 
This woul mean taking each nroblem as it first appeared in 
history and then tracing its development to pre.ent times. 
In this manner one is able to avoid the weakne sses and yet 
keep t he strong points of both views. 
· The first problem that faced J ohn Dewey was the at-
temp~ to roconoile philosophy with psychology. ext this 
paper wi l l take up the theory of logic. Since Dewey's logic 
is both the method used in philosophy and i s said to be de-
rived from philosophy, it could come at either t he beginning 
or end of t he t hesis. It seems iaer to place it near the 
beginning, however. There are two reasons for th s. Since 
Dewey uses his logic to develop hi s epistemology it is best 
to understand clearly what h is logic 1 theories are. The 
seoono reason is that Dewey became interested in logic early 
in his philosoohic 1 studies. After logic there comes the 
question about the subject method of logic whioh is thought. 
Hence it 1a placed next. After thought is considered comes 
the problem of the nature and theory of knowledge. Following 
this comes t he r elationship of Dewey 1 s epistemology to the 
contemporary theories. 
8 
4. Definition of Terms Used 
Epistemologz. Epistemology comes from the Greek word 
episteme, knowledge, and logos, theory. ''It 1 the branch 
of philosophy which investigates the origin, structure, 
methods and validity or kno ledge. tt6 
The term epistemology will be u ed in ita broad sense 
and will include the field of logic and psychology to the 
extent that they go into the theory of knowledge . In con-
idering the term epistemology n attempt wi ll be made to 
use it as Dr . De ey does and not limit it to popular usage. 
Idealism. Idealism is 
any system or doctrine whose fundamental interpretative 
principle i ideal. Broadly , any theoretical or pract-
ical view emphasizing mind (soul, spirit, life), or 
hat is characteristically of pre-eminent value or 
sign ficanc to it.7 
In th1 paper idealism will be spoken of in the s ene 
that Dewey uses it. By idealism De ey usually means Hegel-
ian idealism or absolute ideal! m. He attempts in his 
arly life to reconcile the German school of idealists that 
emphasized the doctrines of Hegel but not the methods with 
th British school that emphasized the Hegelian method but 
not the categories . 
Pragmatic instrumentalism. Pragmatism comes from th 
6~ Leger Wood in Runes (ed.) DOP, 94. 
7. ilbur Long in Runes (ed.), DOP, 136. 
9 
Greek "p ra.gma" and means thing dona. Hence pragm tiam has 
come t o mean the testing of meaning ano t ruth , the logical or 
physical consequences of a oroposition.a 
Pragmati sm as a philosophy 13 not interested in secur-
ing ultimate explanations and absolute or i gins. I t would 
have us to consider all t hings simply i n terms of their 
consequences f or human experience. Consequently, the 
pragmati s t thinks of the mind, of i deas , :· nd of intelligence 
as instruments f or attaini ng certain enda or removing diffi• 
culties and perplexities . It is a method whereby man may 
tes t the vorkability of ideas in his life.9 
Dewey objects to the usa of the term pragmati s t and 
prefers to call hie v iew instrumental i sm. Dewey lists hi s 
objecti ons to pr 1gmatism in ohapterR 2-3 of Logic-- Theory 
of Inqu i ry. The public continues, however, t o regard him 
as the leadi ng exponent of pragmatism. or thi s r eason 
pragmatism and instrumentalism will bo used interchangeably 
in t his paper. When a pragmat ic v1ew ·hioh is different 
from Dewey' s view is used the man's name wi ll be listed with 
t he term pragmatic . 
De ¥e y ' a pragmati sm is 1' ( 1 ) a theory o f meaning, and of 
t ruth or 'warranted assert1b111ty 1 , and (2) a body of fairly 
flexible ph11oaoph1cal dootrines.nlO Analysis is needed to 
8. v. J. McGill 1n Funes (ed .), DOP, 245. 
9. Dewey, DAE , 343. 
10. V. J. McGill in Runes (ed.), DOP , 246. 
10 
connect (1) and (2). 
The instrumental pragmatic view finds acts and functions 
as primary data. It functions both in b iological and social 
aspects . Knowledge comes from these primary function • 
Pragmatism avo ids the go•centr1c predicament . ind recovers 
the agent that unde rtakes and is responsible for t he cognitive 
vent . Pragmatism 1 the method of knowledge . 11 
11. De ey, Art.(l910), 479. 
11 
Chapter II 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 
Historical background. It was Dr . Morris of the 
University of Michigan who led Dewey to an Hegelian posi• 
tion. From Hegel Dewey became acquainted wi th Kant . From 
a study of the writings of these two men he developed a 
crit i cal attitude. He held to the common-sense belief in 
the existence of the world and united Aristotelianism with 
Hegelianism. 
Hegel also had a subjective appeal to Dewey. Hegel met 
the demand for unification that Dewey felt was necess ry in 
any good philosophy . Hegel's treatment of human culture, 
ot institutions and of arts, involved the same dissolution 
of hard•and-fast dividing walls and had a special attraction 
to John Dewey. It wes this emphasis upon uni fication that 
Hegel implanted upon Dewey that tended to give Dewey a con-
sis tent unified philosophy in his early l1fe.l2 
· Along with the influence of Morris and Hegel there were 
two other men that greatly influenced Dewey. Wiiliam James's 
book on Psychology had great influence upon this man. G. 
Stanley Hall's influence on sychologieal topics led Dewey 
to the belief that the relationship between psychology and 
philosophy wer an intimate one. The "ambi tion to hel p bring 
12. Adams and ontague, COP, 21. 
12 
an all iance of the new psychology with philosophy wa divid· 
ing Dewey's intellectual activity to a greater extent than 
he realized. "l3 
Since philosophy as a study of how one thinks and 
psychology a the means by whi ch one could experimentally 
study the thi nking process of mankind , Dewey felt t hat any 
true philoso hy mu t be based upon sychology. Thi t hought 
was uttermost in his mind for over ten years. 
From Hegel Dewey received his emphasis upon the experi-
mental method while James and Hall had done ex erimental ork 
in the field of sychology. Thus if philoso_hy is to use 
the experimental method must not it use the data of p ychology 
and interpret it in ph1loso hioal t hought? De ey cons iders 
almost all o revious philoso hy to be unscientific because it 
did not use the scientific method. For this reason Dewey 
felt that he was a pioneer and started out to establish a 
psychological ph losoohy. 
What it is. In 1886 Dewey came to the conclus on that 
psychology and no t logic was the method of philoso hy . He 
felt that Hegel' s work " consisted essentially in sho i ng 
that Kan11s logi cal standard was erroneous and that, a.s a 
matter of lo io the only true cri t erion or standard wa the 
13. Sehil pp, PJD, 23. 
13 
organic mot . on ••• n14 
Since De ey followed Hegel and felt t hat Hegel had 
surpassed the Kantian logic, th n the only other method of 
use was the psychological . ith the logical method one can 
only end ith the "must be" or the "ought" . The "is" van-
ishes because it has been abstracted. The psychological 
met hod starts from t he ••is" and thereby also gives the basis 
for the •ought • and t he "must ben.l5 
For a definition of the psychological method Dewey 
turns to r~ocke, Book I, chap t er 1, p. 27 and quotas , 
I thought that t he first step towards satisfying 
several inquiries of the mind of man as var apt 
to run into was to tak a vie of our o n undorstand-
ing , examine our o n powers and see to what things 
the w re ad pted.l6 
De y goes on to say that the 
natur of all philosophical inquiry is to. be fixed 
by finding out what experience s ays about them. 
And psychology is the scientific and systematic 
account to this experience. This and this only I 
understand to1~e es ntial to t he psycho ogical standpoint ••• 
Once mor Dewey statea J 
Nothing shall be admitted into philosophy which 
does not sho~ itself in experience and ita nature, 
t hat is, its place in experience shall be fixed by 
an account of the roces of knowledge--by psychol-
ogy. l8 
14. Dewey, Art. (1886) 2, 165. 
15. Dewey, rt.(l886)2, 167. 
16 . De ey, Art .(l886)1 , 2. 
17. De ey, Art .(l886)l, 2 . 
18. Dewey, Art ,(l886)1 , 3. 
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St 11 one more quotation is necessary in order to 
understand De ey's early position. He define psychology 
ass 
The ultimate science of reality, becnus it declar s 
what experienc in it, totality is; 1t fixes the 
orth and me nin of its var1ou lament s by sho ing 
their development and place within this whole . It 
is, in short, philosophic method.l9 
From th se quotation one is able to see that De y 
bell v d that psychology is the scientific and ystematic 
tudy of experience. ince De ey limits philo ophy to ex• 
perience then the only valid method of philosophy i 
psychology, The psychological method is the attempt to 
interpret all philosophy by t he datum of psychology. Onl y 
by this procedure can an experimental ph. loso hy velop . 
Dew~y is once more following Hegel ith his emphasis upon 
experienc as a hol and with his emphasis upon sy tam-
atic sturly of experience. Thus philo sophy and p ychology 
are linked together in a necessary relat1onsh1 and are 
interdependent upon ch other . 
What the method involves - De y , as he start s out, 
earnestly beli v s that the p ychological mothod can alone 
solve all th problems of epistemology. He feels that it 
is h1 duty to develop a n w philosophy based upon ychology, 
19. Dewey, Art.(l886) 2 , 3, 153. 
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This philosophy is li~ted to a study .of experience . He 
further limits himself by insisting that philo ophy mu t 
be objectiv an must not a a e nything. 
A. Its Idealistic Implications. 
Upon this basis he starts to xamin ideali tic 
hiloso hy. He feels that mo t of the idealists hav failed 
to be ob j ctive and to establi h elf-con oiou n a an 
experienced fact . Unless on establishes th~ t s lf-con oious-
nes s is an xp rienoed fact psycholOBY is a subjectiv and 
not an objective m thod. De ey attempts to overcom the sub-
jectivity t at the m thod of introspection ha iv n psychol-
ogy by tting forth epi temolo ic 1 moni m. If i temo-
logical oni m is correct then all the datum given by in-
trospection can b con 1d red as obj ctiv • 
Thus he attem ts to e tablish the obj ctivity of 
psych log • De e fir t of all consider th problem of 
the r lat on of the 8 b ,1 ct to t h object. Con ciousne 8 
i cons d red a the hol an the terms nsubject,. and 
"object" re viewed as art of the hole r ther th n separate 
or indep ndent enti t ies . It i consciou ness that unites the 
ubj ct and obj ct. 
Since subject an object for.m an undifferentiated hole, 
subj~ct1v inAali m is ruled out . B ubjectiv id alism 
Dewey m ana any idealistic view that is an epistemological 
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dualism. Subjective idealism is reject d because it doe sn't 
accept the unity of the sub ect and object . 20 Do y' re-
jection of subjective 1 .. dealiam doea.not mean that he rejected 
idealism but rather that h held to another form or idealism. 
Following Hegel, Dew y held to absolute idealism or ideal ism 
that is monis tic. 
Consciousness is used by De ey in an i dentical way with 
experience . Because consciousness is t he aruma as exp rience 
and makes up the only r al reality, then psychology is the 
s ame as philosophy as has been shown on page fourte n . Thus 
Dewey weaves h a Hegelian idealism into his philosophical 
p yohol ogieal idea • Since th subject and object are th 
same and are parts of t h whole of consciousness De ey feels 
t hat he has establiahen t he objectivity of psychology. The 
method that De7ey used in the study of eon ciouaneas as to 
consider consciousness as a process in t he light of what 1t 
does. Conaciouan as is considered in r lation to it nervous 
system. There is still a problem existing t hat Dewey doesn't 
explain. Gr anting that t he subject and object are the same 
and r p rt of the whole of eon oiouaness 1 is not it true that 
this could establish the subjectivity of psychology a well 
aa the obj ctivity? One of the most common and sci nt1fio 
20 . D w y, Art . (l886)l* 8-10. 
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methods of psychology is the method of introspection. Dewey 
does not deal with the method of introspection in relation to 
his theory of consciousness. Yet inca Dewey connects con-
sciousness and experience then 1t mu t be grant d that the 
consc ous procesBes are experienced. Since no consci ous 
process e s have been experienced directly except by the person 
that has them t hen all direct knowledge must come by the 
method of intros action. This s eems to be defin itely a sub-
jectiv~ process. Thus it seems as if De ey did not establish 
the object . vity of psychology in as thorough manner aa he 
felt he had. 
The relationship of subject and object 1n consciousness 
raises t he oue tion of the dependence of oonsoiou ness on 
somet in not itsel.f. This is solved by eying that t he 
real is not related to consciousness but produces both con-
sciousness itself an t he objects which are related to con-
soiousnes .21 
Delton Thomas Howard felt that ewey used the language 
of ideal i sm but states that it is doubtful if he ever grasped 
t he He elian concept of "concre te universals." He wo ld 
as sign to Dewey an intermediate po i tion between German trnns-
oendentalism and English empiricism and would o 11 this view 
21. Dewey, Art.(l886)l, 8-10. 
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structural idealism.22 
Howard does not seem to grasp the fact that e ~y was 
trying to brin , together the German Begelians anrl the British 
Hegelians and as probably clo r to a trte Heg lianism than 
either school. At any rate, he held to a poR1t1on between 
German and British Hegeliane. This would r ally be a form of 
the He lian dialect c ·ith the German Hegelians as the thesis, 
t he British He alian, as the antithe 1s ana Dewey's vie as 
the ~ynthe i~. 
De y belioves that 1 alism is not a departure from 
the mat rial re3 nted in e roeption beca e this material 
is itsel f irl al. Thus De ey doe not deny the material im-
plications of percention but links them to ideali sm. De ey 
ha s felt that most of the otb .r idealist . c theories have 
denied t e. e material implications. Materialism and ideal-
ism are synthes zed together into a nP ph losophtoal theory . 
Dewey ace pts the reAl ex stance of t he material but since 
it i s pe r•oei ved he considers 1 t as belonging under idealis m. 
In this ystem of De ey's there can be no struggle bet een 
materialism and ide lism.23 elf-consc ousness is the con-
soiou reco n t1on that the ideal element is involved in all 
knowle Actually this idealistic. v1ew of De ~y's is not 
particularly different than the common idealistic theories . 
22 . Howard , DLT, 2-5. 
23. De· ey, Art.(l886), 390. 
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Dewey then con iders the relation of psychology to the 
special sciences. Under spacial science he ould include 
all t he sci noes but psychology . · In it observa.t .on, psy-
chology is like any of the othe r sciences. 11 As to systematic 
observation, experience , conclu ion , and verification, it can 
diffe r in no e ssential way from any one of t hem. '' 24 
B. PaycholoRical Scientific Relationship in E rly Thought 
The difference bet ween p.ychology and t hP special sci-
ences l ies in t he fact that psychology is the study of the 
whole of conscious experience . 25 Geology , geography, physics , 
chemistry and all t he other sc iences each cover only one field. 
Dewey ace pta the reality of the material implications of the 
sciences, but since they are perceived by the mind he links 
them to idealism. He would say t hat each field of sci nee 
gives part of our exoerience . Psychology t ak s up the study 
of the whol of experience so is mor inclusive than any other 
science . In r lity it is the synthesis of all the other sci-
ences. T us psychology stands on a higher plain than all the 
other scienc s.26 
From t he consid ration of the r elation of psychology to 
t he special science, De ey then turns to the problem of matt er 
and form , and their possible separat on. Dewey felt that matter 
24. Dewey , Art . (l886} 166 . 
25 . De ey, Art.(l886)1, 13-16 . 
26 . De ey, Art. (l886)1, 2- 5 ; De ey , Art , {lB86)2 , 152-170 . 
20 
and form could not be separated. Logic is considered to 
be abstract and unable to give reality. Dewey would offer 
the psychological method as a substitute for the logical 
on • 
Ho the J.?AYohological method developed. It 1 unf ir 
to expect all the vagueness of the psychological method of 
t hought to be worked out as soon as it was formulated. It 
presentation in its early form gives us a basi for eeing 
t he development of t he psychological method through t he 
y ar, • It i from th1.s. method t he psychological ph .. loaophy 
emerge • 
De velopment of t he method bet een 1887 and 1903. Dew-
ey s pends t he next aev ral ya rs trying t o es t ablish t he 
psychological method in more po itive form and greater d -
tail . He t akes up the study of the t hought-proces s in 
1 87 in an article in _l!!g entitled "Knowledge as I dealism" . 
Dewey state tha t every idea has t wo spect s : "exi tence 
and m aning; and that the e have bot h abs tract and def-
init perception . "27 
There were unsolved problems in De ey's original po-
sition . This became clear to De e , e pecially in his 
later year • One of t he problems a the rPlation of self 
to t he e t rnal consciousness . This probl em arises from 
27 . De ey, Art . (l887), 394 . 
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his concept of the ~ub eat and object being pert of th 
whole , hieh s con e\ou ness . 
AnothPr problem was the place and import nee of logic 
in a psycholo ical approach. Since Dewey had committed 
himself to the p ychologieal approach aa over against the 
logical he had not established the plac of logic in 
t hought. D ey aernowledges thiA lat r in life hen he 
say th t he es troubled by current dualism in the logi-
cal standpoint and the method bet~een science and word . 
He felt the need for 
the instruction of a lo~ic , that is , a method of 
effective inQuiry, hich would apnly witho~t abrupt 
breach of continuity to th fields designated by 
both of th~ e 1ords, and is t once our need d 
theore~io 1 solvent and the sunply of our practical 
wants. 8 
C. R lation of PsycholoRical ethod to Logic . 
To meet this, Dewey began to ork on hi logical 
theory . His fir t concrete statement of logic took place 
in 1903 with the ap earance of his first book on logic . 
For several years before thi he had been examining the 
logical theories and founn e growing disoont ntment with 
them. In 1891 he attacked both inductive and deductive 
logic in a paper ritten in the onist . At th1 time, 
ho ever, he c n idered Hegel the "quintessence of th 
28. Adam and c illan , CAP , 23 . 
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scientific spirit . 29 
As lat as 1904 he is still trying to develop a p y-
chological logic. He has, ho ever, started th develonment 
of the sci ntific method and these t o system of log c 
w re to b somewhat in conflict . He says of psychologi c 1 
logic that it has 
1v n such a moral and uch a aignific nt inter-
pretation to the nature of thought in genera1 • •• that 
it i hard to e how it can continue ithout in tim 
ffecting some hat profoundly the consideration of 
trtctly logical probl ma . 30 
As hi dev lopm nt 
the H gelian logic. Ther 
nt on he found him elf le ving 
a no o en break · th Hegel 
but rather D y gradually ~ent from the Hegelian logic to 
1nstrum nt 1 logic. He ay of t his bre k ith Hegel th t he 
drift d a ay from Hegelianism in the next fifte n 
years • • • drift expresse the slow nd, for a long 
tim , impercept b1e character of the movem nt although 
it does not convey cau e for a change • • • an acouaintance 
with Heg 1 has left a permanent de oa . tin my .think1ng . 31 
From arounn 1903 onward Dewey felt that he left the 
Hegelian viewpoint. Since he connected Hegel and the p y-
chological m thad togeth r it stands of neces ity that a 
he left one he had to leave th other. It probably is, 
ome have sugge t d, that Dewey's vork in lo ic as th de-
ciding factor that led him away from th psychological method. 
29. De y, Art . (l891), 10. 
30 . De ey, Art . (l904), 60 . 
31 . Adams and ontagu , CAP , 21 . 
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As Dewey left the psyc olog1cal method he felt that 
he had brok n with Hegel's idealism. Lat ron in his life 
as he looked back he as able to se thet Hegel left a 
permanent impre ion upon hi t hinking . In reality De ey 
had gradually left ome of the basic Hag l1an concepts but 
has never overcome the Hegelian influence . 
D way's drift from the Hegelian oonceota were seen in 
his (Dewey' ) emphasis upon the reality of t he material. 
At first he admitted that its re 11ty was dep ndent upon 
p rcept1on an~ thus d veloped an idealistic vie of the ma-
terial. Lat r on, however, he emphasizes the material aspecte 
of perception over the idealistic aspects . This 1as a def-
inite bre k from Hegel' ab olute id ali m. 
A study of the Hegelian influ nee found in John De ~ey 
is ~urprising primarily becau e of its prominence . a one 
goes into the study he finds that Hegel 's influence i seen 
in every p rt of Dewey's phil soohy. any of De ey's finest 
ideas are taken from Hegel and the division between t he t o 
men is not as great as some believe . There do remain basic 
differences, however . 
Present statu ·in Dewey's thought . There i s a vast 
di agreement of opinion as to ho much influence the psy-
cholo ioal anproach had on De ey's later philosophy. Some 
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go o far as to attribut e De ey' pr sent logic to his psy-
chology and metaphysics . It s ems probable thnt this over -
s t ate the ca e, howev r . Others seem to feel th t the 
psychological a. proach h d little influence upon De ey ' s 
later t ught . The most logical view i one in between t hese 
two extremes and realizes that Daychology h a influenced 
Dewey's lat r thought but that it was not the only influence . 
In the next cha t r the relet .0nahip of Dewy ' s early 
views and his 1 ter logical Vi ws w 11 be brought out. I t 
is sufficient to tate h re that the p ychological a_proach 
ha been very influential in De ey'a thought. As for the 
influenc of Hegel , Dew y states , 
I still should bel eve that there is great I' rich-
n as and great er variety of insight in Hegel , than in 
any oth r single systematic philosonh r •• • though when 
I say th .s I exclude Plato • • • 32 
Dewey him elf realize.s that although . he ha developed 
and left the Hegelian and psychological a proach far behind 
they have left a permanent mark u on him. De ey tells of the 
objections he found with the p ycholop; ical approach hen he 
speaks of the two unreconciled standings in ~illiam James' 
book, Psychol ogy . He said , 
one is found in the adop t ion of the subjective tenor or 
prior p yohol ogical tradition, ev n hen the special 
tenets of th t tradition are rationally criticized , an 
32 . Adams and ontague , C P , 21 . 
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underlying subjectivism is retainad ••• 33 
This shows a decisive chang in De from hi earlier 
thought. He had considered psychology to b truly objective 
but h re he realiz e that t 1 ubjecttve. Although he 
accept t h subj ctivity of psychology h considers xper-
ienoe to be objective epistemology . Dewey in the above state 
ment makes on feel th t he believes that a true psychology 
should be objective. One might ask if it is not true that as 
soon as experience is known it passes from the obj ct1ve to 
the subjective. 
De y fully reveals the separation of psychology and 
philosophy in his present- day thought when he says , 
I do not mean that I think that in the end the 
connection of psychology ith philosophy is , in the 
abstract, clo er than is that of other branches of 
science . ogically it stands on tho same plane wi th 
them. But historically and at the pre ent juncture 
the r volution introduced by J mea had , and st~ll 
has, a peculiar sign1ficance . 34 · 
One must analyze thi last quotation to grasp hat 
Dewey believe about the psychological method. It s ap-
parent that the psychological method no longer holds a 
important a place in his philosophy a it once did. o in 
one enae of the word he consider it no more important than 
any science . From an abstract vie there i no closer re-
33. Adams nd 
34. Adam an 
ontague, C P, 23 . 
ontague, CAP, 24 . 
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lat onship of psychology to philo phy than the rel tion-
ship of any other science to ph loaophy. 
This last quotation lso giv s the key as to why he 
h s left the sychological approach. He says t hat "logically 
it s tands on t he same plan " . 34 Hence as Dewey developed 
and crystnllizer his logic the psychological declines in 
importance . He had tried to develop a psychological logical 
v e but had ended in dev loping a logical vie distinct from 
p ychology . Dew ey notes , bo ever , that the a cholog1cal 
has a peculiar ignificance to philo ophy and thu in another 
sense h con iders it more importent than t he other ciences . 
He does t state what this peculiar signtficance is but in 
Dewey's epistemology one c n find a defin te emphasis upon 
experienc • Since experience can be studied by p ychology 
there is a definite relation hip b t ween psychology and 
phtlosonhy. 
Al thoug De ey feels that the dev lopment of the logical 
theory he. decreased the importance of the psychological 
method he is not y t illing to completely give up the psy-
chological mPthod . Thus he dra evidenc from the p ychologi-
cal metl-}od from hist ry and from the present philoso hical 
thought . In leavin the psychological it my be said that 
it furni~hes the stepping- stone to the logical theories of 
De ey . These will bo ~onsidered next . 
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Chapter III 
DE EY 'S LOGICAL THEORY 
l . The Problem 
Imnortance of Logic . John De ey has probably influ-
anced more Amerio n than any other contempor ry .• 
philosonh r . He ha devalo. ed thought in almo t all the 
philo o hical fields. One of the fields that he has gr atly 
influenced i that of logic. 
Statement of th problem. In this pa.per there will 
be an at empt m de to d fine logic in its commonly ac-
c pte meaning, trac it h . torie 1 development , and then 
aho th influence John De~ ay has had upon logic down through 
the years . 
Definition of logic. 
• 1 Logic, traditional ~ the name given to tho e 
parts and that method of tr a t ment of formal logic 
which h s com down sub tantially unchanged from 
clas t eal and medieval times. Tr ditional logic 
emphasizes the a.nalysia of propositions into . ubject 
and pred c te and th s sooiated olas ification into 
four forms, A, E, I, 0; and 1t is concern d chiefly 
ith topic tmmediately related to the e, including 
opposit ion , immediate inference, and t he syllog1 m • 
••• Induction has been added in comparatively modern 
times (dating from Bacon's Novum Or§anum to the sub-
j ct matter of traditional logic . ~~ 
2 . Historical Development 
Pristotle's Logic . Formal logic as developed by 
Ar . stotle . The Ari t telian souare of op osition was one 
35. Alonzo Church in Runes (ed. ) , DOP , 181-182. 
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of the final developments of formal logic. Even today 
.. .. ·' 
Ari totle is con 1d P d the gr at: logician of all time • 
Little cl-- ns 1'1 D made in logic fr~m Aristotl 's times . 
l nd"!ctive logic . Inductive logic we." added to formal 
logic at the ti.me of Francia Bacon:. · ·Bacon , in pired by a 
revolt ag in t f ormal and scholastic logic, propounded an 
inductiv me t hod of discovering truth . 
The inductive method aa a method of d1 co ering 
truth through empirical ob.ervation, analy is of 
observation data, inference resulting in hypothesi 
and verification of hypothesis through continued ob-
s ervat ion and experim ntat1on. 36 
For a f years inductive logic challenged formal 
logi c but in th end inductive logic was given a lace in 
the scheme of logic, where formal logic still held the 
upper hand . F'ormal logic 'I s considered t he ans whe eby 
data as d veloped into organized truth while inductive 
logic gave the data . 
One of Kant's greatest \vorks as the Ori tigue of 
Pure Reason . He sets forth t he idea that the typical func-
tion of r a on is relating or synthe, izing the dat a of 
sense. In the seconrt part of the Critique of Pure Reason 
called Transcendental Logie , Kant treats the synthetic 
forms of understanding, hich he calls 11 categories'' or 
36 ., Runes , DOP , 134 .. 
29 
"pure principles of the und r tandingn. Of the categories 
Kant recogniz tw lve in all and arranges them under the 
head of ou ntity, quality, relation, and modality. 37 
Hegel ' s logic, This s the picture when Hegel en-
tered the c ne . Heg 1 was definitely influenced by formal 
logic and by Kant. To these basic ideas he added the con-
cept of th truth as the hole . B caus the truth i the 
whole , no singl philo ophy, however complet it mny appear , 
c n ol 1m xemption from th universal dialectic principle 
that every synthes1 produc a ?n its o n 1 vel th 
1~ proper to 1t.38 
ntithe• 
Add d to thi 1 the H gelian vie of progress and 
constant d velopment. His logic can never terminate in 
supreme synthesis and olays a double role of uniting o oo 1-
tion and of roviding a negative role for the synthe is . 
1th the idea of the dialectic and of progress, Hegel's 
method emand that his logic be not considered absolute . 38 
~ Loewenberg states that the logic of Hegel 1 w 11 
symbolized in Sh lle as the impetuous and uncontrollable 
est Wind--the spirit which is moving everything, tameless 
and s 1ft and roud, the destroyer and preserver of every 
kind of truth.38 
37 . Otto F. Kraush~ in Run a (ed . ) , DOP , 159. 
38 . oewenberg (ad . ), H s , XIV-XV . 
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To the Kantian antinomy Hegel add d the dialectic . 
This , as it is applied to the cat gories, involves analysis 
and ynthe is. From the point of view of analysis the dia-
l otic is the method hereby each concept may be seen as 
implying i t own opposites as n c ssary an inseparable 
rt of itself. The situation can only be relieved by the 
admi sion of a wider idea in hich the original concept end 
its generated antithesis are reconciled. 39 
The dialectic is the distinguishing feature in II gel's 
thought . The dialectical method consists of three parts: 
thesis 
1 . 
t 
- - - - - antithesis 
2 . 
synthesis 
3 . 
rom th thesis comes its oppo it or the antithesi and 
from t hese t o come ne view , t he synthe is, which include 
laments of both the thesis and antithesis but goes beyond 
them. An example of the dialectic might bes father--thesis , 
mother~-antithe is , and the child as the synthesis . 
Hegel eonsid red logic the true science . Logic had a 
determination peculiar to the thinking act i vity . Th think-
i ng activity consisted in bringing the manifold into unity. 40 
39 . Loe enberg (ed . ) , HES , XVII . 
40 . Lowenberg (ad . ), HES, 99 . 
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H g 1 r cogniz a th t lo ic is more th n ju t a ubj ctiv 
proc a and thus dev lops a ba is for both objectiv and 
subjective logic. Object1v logic consi ta of both the 
e tegories and of dete~nation of reflection. Subjective 
logic i made up of the cience of comprehens1ons . 41 Com-
prehension is Pfine as "the necessary unity of det rmin-
1ng which belong to a whole . "42 Compreb naion has both a 
subjective nd obj ctive part. An idea is the union of th 
subjective with the objective . 
Hegel recogniz a the validity of the throe laws of 
r lations . The first is the law of identity--that A equals 
A. Negatively stated , this is th t proposition A c nn0t be 
A and non- at the same time . The next law of unity that he 
recognized is th law of d tinction. This 1 th t no two 
th ngs arP perfectly identical with each oth r and that each 
thing is the determination of it opposite. A is ither B 
or qon-B , and there is no t hird. The third law calls the 
law of grounds or essence. This is that every something has 
ita suffici nt grounda.43 These three logic 1 principles 
didn't originate 1th Hegel, nor did he develo them in any 
unu ual way but he did use th se law as part of the basis 
for h a logic 1 thought . The se laws of t hought date back to 
41 . Loe enberg, (ed . ) , BES , 103. 
42. Loewenberg, (ed.), RES, 103 . 
43. Loewenberg, (ed.), H S, 110 . 
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the time of Aristotle if not earl ier. 
H g l b 11 ~ v d t t th r a mutu 1 rel t1onsh1 
b twe n o u nd effect . .o u sub t no 
1t or1g1n 1 cont xt into n ffect. The cause thus 
p s e ov r into the err ct . Th effect produce anoth r 
~ause n th r in b co s a cause it lf . Thu o u e 
nd effect ar r 1 t d t d finit ey . 
He 1 ooevted th validity of form l logic but 
ave it a limit d pl c in hi t • He ola 8 d formal 
lof~io und r 8ubj otiv logic nrl div d 8 it under com-
r hena1on, final o use and 1r. s . omprehenaio nolud 
the quantity and too up th ubj ct of the in-livi al . 
universal , a no th part icul r . A syllo i .m 1 a ju gm nt 
ith1n group and judgm nt show th unity of th 
mov m nt gras d togethar . Th subj ct is th t or 
incU 111ual or particul rs h1le th pr~di cate 1 th 
1de of the un1ver:.al . 44 
II S l ' s in.fl !!nce .on D I • Hegel s on of th 
gr nt influeno s upon D wey in 
t.ne 
1-k f1 ld of logic . In 
ord r th t on m1 ht be bl to e e the r 1 tion hip be-
d 
t e n th t o m n it has b n n o s r to bri tly present 
a pictur ot H ~1 ' lo 1c . ft r on gr sp vi w of 
eg 1 n lo ic then he 1 bl to s~ the l e eli nap ots 
4. Lo nb r g . ( d ,. ) , , 125 . 
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1n Dewey 's logic. 
De ey started out as a Hegelian and accept ed Hegel's 
concept thqt 11 1s progres • tnce all 1.s change and 
pro~reRs then logic itealf ought to develop constantly. 
There cnn be no absolute l ogic and thus Dewe . objected to 
formal log1~ th t had not ch nged since the time of Aris-
totle. De e . sets out to e stablish a logical . stem that 
was in keeping with th concept of progreas. 
Another Hegelian t endency is seen i n Deuey in t he 
emphasis given to r eason . Bot h Hegol and Dewey had ha< a 
high appreciation of ~ea on. til l another He el an ten-
denoy ta the emphasis on tho orgPnic view of t he state . 
t i l l anoth r likeness i s . een in t he fact that Dc1ey 
has carri ed on tha idea of universal evolution. And one 
more sim1lar1tv 1 foun in Hegel's vio v that the idea is 
the process. Dewey~ s eo1ally as an idealist, empha-
si.zed the mportanoe of t he idea and the on-go ing force 
in the idea . 
De ez's logic. De ey in 1891 seta u the purpose of 
logic as being ttconcerned vi th the w y mind thtnks and 
not with tho particular objects t hought about.n 45 ith 
t his definitton Dewey was in an excellent position to 
attack fo mal lo ic . Form l logic is cone r ned wit h t he 
45 . Dewey, ·Art .(l8 91}, 4 . 
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p rtlcular obl ct !l thought about. De ey carried over 
into log1o Hegel ' . concept of th.e subjectivity or formal 
log ic. Formal lot,.i c is subj ct ve to J)ew y b cause it con-
cerns ltseltf with p rt1oular objects .nd their relat ion-
s ip to t he un1v r e.ls. J\n objective vi • of logic is 
ooncerned t h the thouvht process . IJ.'hu in Vew y' a 
aarly day he shows A <iefintta relationship between t l)e 
psychologic 1 n roach and the logtoel a pro ch. or.mal 
log ic does mt f t tnt the nsyoholov:1onl .approach to 
htlo ophy ~o it la t"ej cted. 
Now th t De"Jey ha. ''hown that f<,:r"lnallog1o doesn't 
meet the philosophical need a: revealed by h .o defini-
tion of logic, h th~n attack the othPr forns of log ic . 
He foAls thet 1nnuottvn lo~1o 1s an 1mprovement over 
f ormal lo !lc, yet that 1t rloeanot g ive the proper r la-
tion hlp bet een t hought and f ct . Here the p oblom of 
epistemological duali vs . moni m ar1se • De ~ey believe 
that inductive logic fa1la to ho t he oroper union bet e 
t he object s.nd the thouq,ht . o he rejects 1nduot1ve logic . 
l e ev al o so.ta orth th d a thet f o mal logic 
insuff cient, so :ta inr'!uct:tve lop c. since 1t uses the 
s~mA b a i a ne uottve lor 1o . 46 Th s~ rat on of object 
and p roe v r 1 ~ neoe a is 1n deductive log1o . 
4ci . De · ey, rt. 1891), 6 . 
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Since formal logic leads to epistemological dualism it is 
rejected. The basis of Dewey's objection of both formal 
and inductive logic is that they are concerned with the 
objects thought about and not t he orkin ~ processes of the 
mind. Thus to him both deductive and in uctive logic are 
subjective and untenable to a psychological approach. 
Dewey feels that a true log ic must deal with the processes 
of thanght and so att empts to develop a new logical theory. 
Dewey seta forth the idea tha t " logic should not deal 
with the thing back of the fac ts of science but wi t h the 
analysis of scientifi c method as s uch".47 Dewey shows his 
~rument with Hegel hen he speaks of Hegel's logic as 
showing the nquinteasence of the scientific spirit". His 
concl uding idea in "Monist" was that t here was soon coming 
a time where critical logic will run to t he parti cular 
t hesis of po it ve science. 
John Dewey tried to develop a new theory of logic that 
would adequately t ake into view Hegel's idea of p rogres s . 
This theory of log ic was t o present an analysis of scien-
tifi c method and to take an objective view of logic. 
Dewey didnot develop hi s theories of logic in great detail 
until 1903. Before this time he had been primarily con-
cerned with the psychological approach to philosophy. In 
47. Dewey. Art.(l891), 8. 
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1903 he published h i s first book on logic. This repre-
s ented a forwa rd step in the shaping of his logical theories. 
He noted that there were s everal other trends in 
the fiel d of logic. There was an attempt t o reform t he 
traditional syllogistic and inductive logic by common 
sense. Mathematics had come into being a s a valid expres • 
sion of logi c. An attempt wa s being made to develop 
mathemat i cs into a system worthy in itself as an adequate 
representat on of logic. St i ll a thi r d trend was the de-
velopment of l ogic in connect i on with comparative and 
general g r ammar. It was believed that one was able to 
tell how a nat on or group of people thought by a com-
parative study of their grammar.48 
To these three trends Dewey added two of his own. 
The first was psycholog ical logic which gave 
such a moral and s uch a s i gnificant interpretation 
to the nature of thought in general ••• t hat it i s 
hard to see how it can continue without in time 
affect n somewhat nrofoundly the cons i derat i ons 
of s trictly log ical · roblems.49 
Dewey's view of psychological logic and its im-
portance to the fi eld of lo 1c is clearly seen in the 
way that he defines 1 gi c as t he working process of the 
mind. It logic i s concerned with the working proce s ses 
48. Dewey. Art.(l904)1, 57-62. 
49 . Dewey, Art.(l904)2, 66. 
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of the mind then it is really psychology. Thi emphasis 
upon the psychological aspect of logic is a development 
of Dewey's psychological approach to ph losophy. Dewey 
had started out as was noted in Chapter II , to approach 
all philosophy from the psychological viewpoint. From this 
he carried his view of psychology into t he field of logic. 
By 1904 Dewey had begun to doubt som of h1s earlier con-
cepts about the relationship of psychology and philo ophy 
but as the above quotation shows, the psychological view-
point definitely influ need h i s logical v ewpo nt. A has 
been noted the p yahological pproach came to Dew.ey from 
Hegel, so Heg 1 actually forms the basis for De ey's logi-
cal t heories. 
The secon trend of logic that De ey set forth as 
the scientific method. Dewey examined t he me t hode of the 
scientiets and develop d their methods into a philosophical 
system. This sc ientific method is both empirical and shows 
the ctivi ty of t hought. 
3. Scientific Kethod 
What i t is. The other trend that De 1ey 1 a book of 
Logic gave was the deYelo ment of the scientific method. 
The method is suggested here, develo ed in De ey's book, 
How We Think, and developed in Dewey 's book on logic written 
in 1939. In 1903 Dewey considered himself the le ader of 
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scientific men undertaking an independent statement of 
the logical bearing of the i r o n modes of investigation. 
Science should not be bound by the old rules of logic but 
should dev lop new one • 
In the development of t he sci entific or real logic, 
De ey draws upon both formal and inductive logic and makes 
these an important part of his ne logic. Once more the 
dev l opment of Dewey's logical system shows the i nfluence 
of Hegel. It was from Hegel that Dewey received th i des. 
of the experimental method and Hegel's dialectic i s seen 
in the ynthes is De ey draws f rom the psychological and 
logical approach.50 Dewey, like H el, also uses formal 
and inductive logic in his larger logical ystem. 
De ey's first book on logic as printed in 1903 . It 
is oa led 'tudies in Logical Theory, and Dew y outlines 
his logical system in the first four cha ters. In this book 
he make judgment the es ence of knowledge. Thinking 
doesn't begin until our habitual reflexes are found in de-
quate to meet our needs . He advance the idea that 
dualist c find any criteria of truth so he t akes a 
mon stic view of epistemology. Thi s monistic view of 
epistemology i one more ign of s imilarity be twe en. Hegel 
and w • 
-------·-------------------------
50. De ey, HW1 , 58. 
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There are many fine ideas in the Studies in Logical 
Theory but it is open to orne seriou object i ons. Sheldon 
realized this and criticized Dewey's theories on the basis 
that pragmatism borro s from biology and then claims that 
it iA the only genuine philosophic method. Sheldon he r e 
is makin a valid criticism of Dewey. John Dewey was 
greatly influ need by Charles Dar in and other oi nt sts. 
ewey believed that the sci nt1f1o method was re ally the 
method that the biologist and other such scientists used 
or should us • This idea of Dewey star ted in the Studies 
in Logical Theory and developed some hat in How We Think 
between pages 90 and 94 and then wa presented more clearly 
in De ey 1 s book on Darwin. One may object to this biologi-
cal philosophy because it noesnot give a picture of the 
hole, and it approaches other sciences and universals of 
values and idoals from a re tricted vie .51 De ~ey's logical 
theory dismisse the proble of kno ledge of xternal 
reality a insoluble. This is a ay to dismiss problems 
without solving 
By 1910 Dewey had l eft some of his H gelian ten encies 
but he h ld to th ba ic Hegelian 1 ea of progress. Thus 
he felt till the logical theor1 a of mankind should e-
velo • De ey, ith Hegel, also set forth th experimental 
51. Brightman, Ir P, 58. 
52. Sheldon, Art., 99-103. 
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method, the dialectic a proach to many of man's problems 
of logic, and at times seems to follow Hegel in epiate o-
log.ical monism. Dewey is not altogether consistent in this, 
however. One can see that Dewey was permanently influenced 
by Hag 1. D way's second book in the field of logic was 
How We Think . In this book Dewey presents clearly the five 
step of scientific thought. These he lists on page 72 as 
(1) a felt difficulty, (2) its location an definition, 
(3) suggestions of po sibl solutions , (4} development by 
reasoning o.f t he bearings of the suggestion, and (5) which 
is farther observation which is experimentation leading to 
its acceptance or rejection. 
Dev1ey realized that some might try to corAbine these 
five steps and says that some may consider steps one and 
two as the same and even admits that at tifnea they may be 
the same, but he still insists that there is a l ogical dis • 
tinction betJeen them. 
Ma.x Eastman condensed the five steps into three. 
These three steps were: 
1. Felt difficulty defined. 
2. Suggested solution developed by reasoning. 
3. Experimental application of the suggestions. 53 
Dewey also takes up a study of inductive and deductive 
53. Eas tman, Art .(l904), 244-248. 
41 
logic and relates lt to t he scient ific method . Fro in-
f erence he conclu~es that one is able to d rive suggestions 
a to possible solutions of the problem. He feels that 
d ductive reasoning is used to give the development of t he 
im lications of the sugge tions.54 Induction leads t o the 
di covering of binding principles while deduction leads 
t oward test ing , confirming, refut ng, modifying on th 
ba is 'of its capacity to interpret isolated details into 
unlfied exper1enoe.55 'rhus one sees t hat Dewey' s tt new 
logicu i s an e mple of the Hegelian dialectic using both 
. 
deductive ~nd in uotive logic to give a oonc usion . 
c1entif1o induction is defined a 
all the processes by which the observing and amass-
ing of data are regulated ith a view to facilita-
ting the Egrmation of explanatory conceptions and 
theories. 
Thus Dewey hi self rea izes that inductive logic la s an 
important part in hi lo ieal system and from his defini-
t ion one can put all ttempt to find the r i ht solutions 
to t he felt p roblem under deductive logic . 
D wey t hen goes into a com arison of f.lmpiric 1 and 
sci ntific thi ing and logic. -He admits that mpirical 
t h nlci ng and logic are adequate i n ome things but feels that 
54. Dewey, HW~, 77. 
55 . De ey, T, 82. 
56 • D wey, IDi , 6 . 
(._ 
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it doesmot give a criterion for judging between right and 
wrong beliefs. He also fee l s that it does not enable us t o 
cope with the novel sttuat .on and that it leads one to lazi-
ness, presumntion and dogmat1sm.57 In contrast to this em-
piricalmethod, De'ley set forth the scientific method. Science, 
according to .tm, is t he most p~rfect type of know edge be-
cause it uses causal def nittons.58 
The scienttfic me thod breaks up tho coarse, gross fact s 
of obsPrVations into a numbe~ of m nute rocesses not direct-
ly ace ssibl to erception. When thinkin is used as 
means to some end, good or value beyond itself, it is con-
crete; when employed simply a a means of more thinking , i t 
1a abstract .59 
Th scientific metho relies on differences . his i a 
a method of anal ysis. T e scientific method is a process 
of anal . sis and ynthea1s in expet•imental thin <ing. 60 'l'he 
advantages of the scientific method are soan in that it 
les sens liability to error, it is interested in the future 
and in pro ress, a.nd the scientific ia able to synthesize 
both its physical and logical forcen togather.61 
Even in 1910 Dewey folt t hat . h~re was a relation be-
57 . Dewey , HWT , 147 . 
58. Dewey, BWT, 134. 
59 . Dewey, HWT , 150. 
60. Dewey, HWT, 152 . 
61. De wey, HWT, 153-154. 
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tween the psychological an o ic 1 me od. Thus h eld 
to the s ame definition of lo ic a h s t forth in 1891 . 
The book How We Thin was primarily a development o f this 
theory. 
Logic , 1939. Th next gr at development in Dewey's 
logic wa his monument 1 book, Logic: The Th ory of Inauiry. 
Here he makes data not the tarting point of knowledge but 
the aituat on a the beg nnin po nt of the problem. This 
is r eally th d v lopment of h , definition of l ogic back 
in 1891 when h said that logic "concerned with the way mind 
thinrs and not with the art icular objects t hought about . n 
The sci nt fio mPth is a furthe development of the idea 
of making the situation the starting point of logic. De ey 
at rts with the problem ox i tuation at h nd and goes f rom 
t her into t he f1 Ald of logic. He has al ~ ys emphas ized 
meet ng a erson wher he is and t hen develo ing from th t. 
The partie lar object of formal logic would be the data 
whil the beginning of the think i ng process is the estab-
lishment of a s ituation or logical problem. Dewey also 
rec gni ze th s f~ct when he s At up the scientifi c met hod 
1n 1910. 
Accor ding to Dewey t hree c ommon errors in logic are 
t hat t1e co on- ens orld i s not perceptual, that per-
ception is not a mode of cognition, and that perception 
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is not ognitive in status. In his t heory he hopes to 
overoom these objections. ·-Dewey hore would disngree wi t h 
Berg on a idea of making perception a for1 of action rather 
than a orm of cognition. 62 Dewey a ss igns to perception a 
defini t cognition. 
/ that 
De, ey deni es immediate know edge but admits s ometh ing 
he calls apprehension. He states: ~hia kind of direct "knowledge" I shall call appre-he sion; it is seiz ing or grasping, intellectual l y , wi 
1
hout questioning , but it is a product , med ated 
th~ou h certain organic mechanisms of re t ention and 
ha91t and it presupposes prior exp eriences and mediate s 
conclusions drawn from the:m..63 
Th moat distincti v-e thing in Dewey's logic was the empha-
sis upon inquiry ss opposed to truth or knowledge. Inqu ry 
as not considered a search for t ruth but wa s innependent of 
truth. nqutry was t he changing of a situat ion from ita 
or iginal parts into a unified whole. I nquiry ia an i nter-
the 
t ween object and aubj ect. 'l'hua one can still see 
ence of psychology upon Dewey's logical theory . 
h and the scientific method . Truth is not an 
conception 1n Dewey's logic. 
uth is that concor anoe of an abstract statement 
with the ideal limit towards which endless invest1ga-
would tend t o bring scientif1c b elie f , while 
rdance t he abstract statement may posse s s b y 
e of the confession of its inaccuracy and 
62. Herman Hausheer in Rune s (ed.), DOP, 228. 
63. Dewey, LTI, 143. 
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on~-sidedness and th1s confession is an 
1nfred1ent of truth.64 
This concept of truth is rather vaguo. 
ttuth an ab tract statement 1 r- ving 
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essential 
Anyone ho 
t a degree of 
va.guene s . H story for hun~reds of yea:rs ha shoVJn man's 
search for truth. This ha been an attem t to find out what 
oorresp~nds to r~ality. To put this aea:roh off as hunt 
for an lbstraot idea does not explain the ab~olute element in 
tr;~th. If truth is abatr ct, then it tends to lack dof1n-
iteness 1 cone tenes , an1 rmanenoe. How can something 
be true at one time an1 false at another? Dewey's view 
doe , no~ really se m to r aoh the heart of the problom of 
truth. He ha. selected h1 a data and has not considered all 
the fact • D~v ey states that t he word truth lacks accuracy 
in mode~n technical usage. Inquir te~1natea in belief and 
knowled~e. 
In ia recognized in certain acttvitias. It is 
t he wor of inquiry to mant ulate and alter its subject mat-
~ss-
ter until it becomes logically a a1milable. Dew y do s 
adm~t t1at th~re msy be some form of absolute truth. He 
' states t at he does not hold to the view that he "tolerates 
no fra1l~y of me~n1ng parading as ultimate truth ,, 
knowledg • 11 Success is ac 1eving de ired end~!. 
o'r absolute 
Thi s is 
making space s e purely ocial thing--it doe. not consider 
the ind~f"tdual. 
64. De ey, LTI, 394•395. 
65. Dewey, Art.(l947), 432. 
66. Dewey, Art.(l946), 534. 
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Public verificat ion. De ey holds to the view of 
I 
pub l ic verification. By thi s it is meant that something 
is tru hen it is verified by the people. If something 
is trur it must not only be true once but should continue 
to be f rue. Thi s is a continuation of the scientific 
method. He feels that t here is no better way t o evaluate 
experimental lo 10 than to apply to it the same te sts as 
appl1e? to other theor1es.67 
If one scientist can perform a certain experiment 
under ~ertain condit i ons then another scientis t should be 
able t f perform the s ame experiment wi t h the s ame condi-
tions rnd achieve the same r esult. 
S ~noe every hypothesis is to be tested to find out 
its vat idity, then a hypothesis is not true until it has 
passedl the test of public verification. 
H re t he question mi ght be asked i f a t hing is true 
becaus' it has been te ted and found out to be true, or 
was it \true even before it was tested? Does testing make 
a thing true? Was the law of gravity true before it had 
been d~ ecovered an publ ely verified? 
FJom a practical point of view it woul d seem fair to 
say thJ t Dewey doe smot believe in absolute truth. If truth 
1s not \absolute then one would have to s ay that a thi ng is 
6~ . Schilpp (ed.), lOB. 
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not true until it is publicly verifiad, and is true only 
insofar as it is ?erified. As far as showing how a thing 
becomes true by testing, he doesn't attempt to explain. 
It seems as if Dewey reduces truth to a flexible idea and 
that it lacks p ermanence. h s vi w seems to lack coherence 
bee use according to it this paragraph may be true today and 
wrong tomorrow. It seems to many the human experience 
te tif1es that truth by its very nature cannot be relat ve 
but absolute. Dewey would reject t his absolute ide of 
truth, ho ever. 
'l'he idea of public verificatton raises still another 
problem; almost every established hypothesis tarted out as 
individually known truth and then as d to the stage of 
truth that had public verificat1.on. Since truth according 
to Dewey is social and not individual, when does a hypothe-
s is become established as truth? Is it when it ha been 
verified by most of the people, some of the peop;J.e, or all 
of the people? It is easy to say that ublic verific tion 
of inquiry establishes truth hen those capable of appl ing 
it say no. The question still remains as to what standard 
can be used to find out who is capable of using public veri-
fication. 
It seems s if Dewey contradicts himself and his idea 
o public verification when he presents the ide that the 
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sole test for the truth of any idea is t he us efulness of 
its consequences. By the f r u i t s of an act one is able to 
judge if it is true or not. 68 Si nce the consequences of an 
act usually haopen to the ind i v idual tha t has caus ed the 
act, t hi s make s truth individual and not soci al. I f a per-
son is able to judge an act according to its consequences, 
then as f a r a s that individual is concerned, he i s t he 
highest judge. Dewey doe s not correlate this ind i v idual• 
is tic view wi t h t he view of publ i c verification, whi ch i s 
soc i al. 
Relation of Dewey ~nd Hegel. Dewey's logi c al t heories 
in 1939 tend to a less i dea l istic approach than in 1903, but 
t here i s still a de f inite Hegelian aspect. For Dewey, as 
for Hegel, cont inuity is pervasive and al l-embraci ng. 69 
Dewey stiil emphasizes the Hegelian i dea of progress, t he 
experimental method, and epis t emological monism. 
Pragmatic idealism is g rounded on a rea lis t ic and 
naturalistic basis in Dewey's logic, but he i s never abl e 
to escape compl etely t he influence of Hegel. Dewey does 
differ from Hegel, how ve r, in hi s stre s s of t he s pecifi c 
and differential conditions unde r which natural events are 
experienced--plural i ty, indi viduality, novelty, and p iecemeal 
charaoters.70 
68. Barrett, PHI, 136. 
69 . Schilpp (ed.), PJD, 106 . 
70. Schi lpp (ed.), PJD, 108. 
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Dewey's phi losophy begins and ends in the logical 
theory as the prooer method of inquiry. Logic is a tool , 
a method, and Dewey feels that logic grew out of inquiry 
into nature. Aristotle felt that logic was a means of 
examining nature and was outside of n ture, while Dewey be-
lieved that his logic developed from nature. 
All t hat logic can hope to do according to Dewey is 
to generalize and sys t ematize what special investigatnm do 
when th y are successful. 
One r eadil y sees th t ewey ba8 an unusual v lew of 
logic and because of his defin1 tion of logic includes much 
under it that is placed elsewhere by other philosophers . The 
fundamental idea of logic, then, is "that the primary subject 
matter of philo ophic inquiry is a continuously interoon-
nected field of experience. ••71 
Definition of Terms . In connection with De ey's sci-
entific theory, there are seve::roal terms that should be noted. 
The most important ones are data e.nd meaning . Dewey, being 
true to his pr gmatic ideas ays that there is no thought 
without language behavi or. Be realizes the d1ft'1culty of 
trying to establish basic d&fln . tiona in philosophy and feels 
that with sueh a. basic term as dett nition there is too much 
71. Sch1lpp ( e-d.}, PJD,. 50. 
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disagreement to establish any real agreement. He does 
attempt to defi ne his terms.- and Pratt has probably grasp ed 
as clearly a anyone Dewy' definiti ~ of me ning. 7 2 
Pratt has grouped Da e ' cone tion of meaning un r 
thre heads: 
1. Some meaning are 1nt.rins1o to natur 1 events 
a experienced; they are ad as i mmediately nd as 
directed a ualit1 s. Pr -analytic and post-analytic. 
2. Obj ct re objects beca se t hey make 
"Si n-si nifie nc '' relation of inf E>nce. 
in is extr1n io r 1nstrum nt 1. In this 
oa s from one object to anoth r obj ct. 
sense. 
T i man-
inquiry we 
3. Cl s of s bol-m aning hioh we · cquire and use 
in languagA operation in d velop ing implications. 
Idea.s or ymbol means things only s they "r fer" 
to have Ita plio tion1• to thing , and their a plication 
is by way of obs rv~~ion of and e eriment with exis-
tential ha ening • 
Th other 1m ortant definition as he term data. 
"D tum is no . h t i 1ven but h at 1 . taken, elected, 
not d, b erv d, discriminated for the purpose of infe rence.n74 
The dtum is 1 cte from the hole f1 ld of conscious x-
erience. 1th this ef .nition of data it is easy to limit 
our data to just the fact s that bring out the conclus ion8 
you e ir • For this r aaon som hav ob.ected to t his def-
in tion of data and would rather 1n 1st that the 1dea of 
72. D ey, 
73. ch11 
74. Sehilp 
rt.(l946), 425. 
(ed.), PJD, 122-123. 
(ed.), PJD, 124. 
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selection and interpr tat1on comAs in the establishment of 
the hypothesis, ot 1n the gathering of the ata. It is 
upon th definition of the term ata that one' 
-
1nt 
retat1on of the scientific thod dep nds. 
If on~ 1s allowed to sel ct e rta1n dat nd ignore 
oth r data, then there is no ay of being sur th t one's 
conclusions ar tru • onclusions ar true only to the ex-
tent t hat they re based upon and established by all the 
data . 
Pratt sees in De ey' Logics The Theory of Inguir;r a 
relatton bip bet een 1deal1 , realism nd ra t1 m. Be 
thinks thn t Dewey finds n -end ring truth of' ch. hese 
are: 
id al1sm--faotuality must e 
befor can make judgment 
of realism--factuality mu t ha e 
rt1cul t structure of its own 
can have r.el1anc nd. val1d1 ty. 
et1v org 1 ms 
e can lt~r tact 
lly applying our r-
4. Problems Ignored by De ey 
Kno n and unkno n. Now that De ey' logical views 
have been consider d, 1 t might b well to eal w1 th the 
75 . ch lp ( d. , JD, 126. 
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problema Dewey does .not take up. Dewey has used inquiry as 
his basis for logic. It is by inquiry that the unknown i s 
transformed to the known . If one can only knovt what he ex-
periences by sense perception, t hen hy b Alieve the unknown 
exists? The unknown is not experienced, for the minute it is 
experienced it stops becoming tmknown . If a thing is un-
known ho does one knov t hat it exis ts? This same crit cism 
would apply to any other empirical approach to philosophy. 
The problem ariae a from Dewey's insistence that one can only 
know what ia experienced by sons~ ptrception . ... ince the 
unknown is not perceived how does ono know th t it exists? 
One may say that our knowledge of the unknown is problematic, 
but this does not olve the problem, b~t merely pushes t 
baok. If a thing is probable it js known in u limite sense, 
a d since all knowledge is g in0d by ex er1ence, then even 
the probable or unkno n has ~l r ady b e en experienced. Thus 
this view does away wi bh all possibility of knowing since lt 
destroys all that s to b e known or the unkno n. his prob• 
lem seems to remain unsolved, as long aA one holds to exper• 
ienoe a g ving the only ba . is for tputh. 
Knowledge and its teleological asoocts. De ·ey has 
predicated the idea that knowledge i not one of the nde 
of life but is rather a means to other satisfactions. One 
might jus t ly ask what satisfactions knowledge is a means to 
and how is it known that knowledge is not an end in itself 
for some! 
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Scientific method not &ppl i cable to all problems. 
Friend and foe of Dewey alike must admit t ha t D ~ey's logi-
cal theories have had grent influence in America . rewey's 
scienti f ic method is that basi~ for almost all scientific 
work today . I t i not that Dewey originated the cientific 
method bu rat~er that he r cordod t he methods used b . the 
scientist3 of his day . After he hnd recorded t then he 
tried to make it all t he more oohe~ent. The scientific 
method is anplioable only to o roblems that rise from sense 
experience. Since D8wey lim ts his search for knowledge to 
t he scientific method, he cannot do 1 with all th problem 
of knowl edge. By this he limit h .mself to sen e ex re ion. 
5. I nfluence of ev;e:r ' s Logic 
Th re is e danger i n ma~ing t he scientific m thod the 
t est of all truth . Science is _im. ted to i t abil ty to 
obtain data and the sc i entific method is not in a posi t1 n 
to dete rmine certain phil so hie 1 generalizations . uch as 
ultimate values , nature of God, and oniam or dualism. The 
scientific method 1s s form of ans ly is ~h11e t he true 
philosophical spirit is ono of synthesis , 
I n ph11 sonhy th scientific '!ethod has l a id the 
bas l s for the prsgoatic and tho realistic p l osoph1es . 
Only idealism with its emphas1s u on the hole world view 
ins t ead of an analytic view has r a ised ob j ections to t he 
scientifi c me thod. Idealism does not object to the sc i -
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entific method in itself but does object when it is used 
as the sole criterion for truth. The scientific method is 
also the analytic method. Although idPalism may object 
to eome of Dewey's 1 eas, even it has been influenced by 
pragmatism. 
In the field of Aristotelian logic Dewey's influence 
has been felt. Experimental logic has not done away with 
Aristotle's logic but rather as Burtt does in Right Think-
ing, chapter 2. Dewey's scientific method is combined 
with Aristotle's logic. Whether or not experimental logic 
will be assimilated by Aristotelian logic as was inductive 
logic, only time oan tell. There is, however, a trend in 
this direction today. 
Chapter IV 
THOUGHT 
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After one has considered Dewey as an individual and 
has seen his relationship to the fields or sychological 
philosophy and of logic, it becomes necessary to consider 
Dewey's ideas on t hought. There is a tendency among some 
philosophers to consider logic as part of thought and there 
is a close relationship between them. There is a distinc-
tion between logic and thought, however. Logic is the 
method of the thought process and shows the correct re-
lationship between thoughts. For this reason logic and 
thought have been separated in this paper. By separation 
each aspect may be presented more clearly and distinctly. 
Before one can clearly understand Dewey's position here, it 
becomes necessary to define what is meant by thought. 
1 . Introduction 
Different eanings of Thought. De ey defines thought 
in several different ways in his book, Ho '"" e Think. He 
speaks or thought in its broadest extent as " everything 
that comes to m1nd".76 He then limits t he meaning by 
"excluding whatever is irectly present."76 The third 
meaning is further limited, nto beliefs that rest upon so~e 
kind of v i dence cr testimony.n76 This third meaning is 
divided into two parts. The first is "a belief Lthat7 is 
76. Dewey, HWT, 1. 
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accepted with slight or almost no attempt to state the 
grounds that support it.•76 The other kind of thought is 
called reflective thought and is the systematic search for 
the ground or basis of a belief. 
ebster defines thought as the "mental concentration 
on idea s as distinguished from sense perceptions or emo-
tions; reflection; cogitation. t 77 a Dewey has pointed out. 
the. term "thought' has so many meanings that :t t leads to 
ambiguity if one doesnot decide which meaning of thought 
he will choose. Since this thea a is concerned with John 
Dewey's epistemology, thought will be defined as Dr. De ey 
defines it. He defines thought as " that operation in which 
present facts suggest other facta (or truths} in such a ay 
as to induce bel ief in the latter upon the ground or ~arrant 
of the former. "78 He makes another d1st inction when he 
speaks of r eflective thought. Reflective thinking 1 the 
highest type of thought. This i s the critlcal examination 
or the und rlying bases or any supposed knowledge or belief 
to see upon what ground this knowledge or belief rests. 
2 . General Factors in Th nk1ng 
In a study of the general factors of thought it has 
be en the trad tional approach to consider the roblon or 
t:J.e. 
consctousness. De 'ley takes up a study or..,conscious and 
77. abater, I SD, 2148. 
78. Dewey, HWT, 8-9. 
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and consciousness in the Journal of Philosophy in 1906. He 
presents the idea that the consc ous f actor is a social 
factor, wh le consciousness is a joint or mutual awareness. 
He do~sn't consider this a philosophical dist notion, however. 
In a philosophical sense he defines "conscious'' as being 
aware and consc ousness as the s t ate of being a are. "Con-
sc ousu is a '' tate or faculty or being conscious, as a 
condition and concomitant of all t hought, reeling and voli-
t on.n79 
In one of D wey's lates t definitions of terms (Art. 
1946) he st t e s that hen the term consc ousness is us ed 
with any other meaning than that of awareness, it is a 
vague conc9pt and has no value whatsoever.BO Becaus~ he 
feel that the term consciousness is vague , he tends not to 
us e it. Consciousness is a term that can be left out of 
Deweyrs thought . There i s no place for a distinct concept 
of con ciousness. Consciousness i d vided into the dif-
ferent activities of habi t s and 111 . Habits rule one's 
thought. A s t udy of his books, Ho "e Think and Logtct 
The Th~ory of Inquiry, shows that he asserts that conscious -
ness is behavior and that all one calls his conscious life 
are physiolog!cel r .actions of his organism. As De ey 
discusses behaviorism, he is actually discussing consciousness . 
79 . Dewey, Art .(l906), 40 . 
80. Le ey, Art.(l946), 88. 
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This behavioristic doctrine of Dewey gains its support 
from the b olog1cal sciences and from the unity of the 
sciences. 
He also speaks of behavioral inquiry as that in hicb 
the "proce. sea examined are not currently e.xplorable by 
psychologytt.Bl Vi th this behaviorist idea or consciousness, 
Dewey goes on to analyze thought. He reels that there is 
n common ground or element in all kinds or types or thought. 
Besides this basic imllarity 1n thought the h ghar forms 
include au estions of some things not observed in the 
sensory data. Reflective thinking involves not only the 
simpler elements or t hought, but alBo reflection. Thu all 
thought has certain basic i dea s in common with higher forma 
of thought, and the higher forma or thought go beyond ob-
8 rvation snd involve reflection.82 
3. Reflective Thinking 
Definition or reflective thinking. It has just be n 
noted that refl ctive thought has certain baste similari-
ties ith the simpler types of thought. Besides obser a-
tion, reflective thought includ a the rational interpre-
tation of the objects p ree1ved. De ey defines reflect! e 
thought as the 
active, era tstent, and c retul considerat on of 
any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the 
81. D~wey, LTI, 25-29. 
82. Dewey, BWT, 7. 
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l ight of the groun ds that suppg~t it, and the further 
conclusions t hich it tends. 
Parts of reflective think ing. Before there can be any 
reflective t hinking , there must be a sta te of uncertainty or 
the establishment of a problem. ~he cause or this sta te 
or unce r t a inty ie the pr .oblem. fter one becomes aware 
of the s tate of uncertainty, he then tries to grasp ac" 
curately just what is the problem . lt isneceasary in re -
flectlve thoup-ht to grasp a cle r idea o f" the p roblem in 
order t hat one may be able to suggest adequa te s olutions. 
There is an attempt to gather all the f acts that re rele-
vant to t he subject~ Reflect ion i s for the purpose ot 
discover ng facts or hypotheses that will help solve the 
problem involved . The udema.nd for the solution of a per-
p l exi ty is the steadying and gu ding fa ctor in the ent:!r e 
p rocess of r eflect on.n84 As the hypotheses tor solv ng 
t he problem pr sent t hemselves to t he mind, without re-
flect t ve thinking there would be no way of select i ng or 
choosing the des red solut on. Reflec t i ve t hinking not 
only distinguishes which solution seems the mo t probable, 
but als ives means for testing the p roposed solutions. 
Dewey sums it u by saying , ttthe problem fixes the end of 
thought and t he end controls t he proces.s of t b1nk1ng .. "85 
83. Dewey, HW'I', 6. 
84. Dov.re" , HW'f , 11. 
as. Dewey, HWT , 12. 
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One may have the problem clearly defined and have 
·gathered the data necessary to solve the problem, but 
that is not enough. It is not suff cient to have the 
scientific method to solve the problem, but there must be 
the conscious act of reflect ve thought that produces the 
solution to the problem. The sources that this reflective 
thought is based upon are past experience and prior 
knowledge. Reflective thinking involves the suspension 
of ju gment during further inquiry. 
Analysis of reflective thinking. Before one begins 
to analyze thought to see when and ho it reaches the 
stage of reflective thought , it might be well to find 
out what is the goal of the development of r efle ctive 
thought. "To develop reflective thought one must formu-
late ca reful, al rt, and thorough habits of think1ng."86 
As thinking develops from observation to analysis, it goes 
from simple thought into reflective thought . In order to 
do reflective thinking, one must develop a di s c plined 
mind. i scipline is not negative but positive and con-
s tructive. By developing one's thought processes, he 
becomes able to t hink analytically. 
The simpl est kind of reflective thinking doesn tt 
take one outside the limits or everyday experience . 
either the data nor the ways of interpreting the data 
86. Dewey, HWT, 59. 
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are new or outside daily experience. An example or this 
would be when a person is tired. ~hmld he or should h e 
not go to bed? This may be called a simple case of pract-
ical deliberation. The next kind or t hought forms e. 
natural transition; the datum is within everyday exper-
ience, but the problem arises some hat indirectly out of 
one activity. Thus this is a. step beyond the first kind 
of thought and has a somewhat theoretical basis. An ex-
ample of this would be the observation of a ole. One 
begins to reason what the pole is u ed for. As he reflects 
upon what he has observed, it is an example of t hi s 
second kind of reflective thought. 
The last kind of reflective thought involves the 
specialization of special training, and both its problem 
and the mode o.f solut ~.on are outside the limits of every-
day experi ence. This would be t he case of reflect on in-
volving experimentation. A scientist orks out an experi-
ment and then reflects upon the meaning of the r esults.87 
The logical atens involved ln reflective thinking are the 
· same as in the scientific method , but a distinct on must 
be drawn between the method and refl e.ct1ve thought. Re-
flective thought is the .force that puts the scientific 
method into operation . 
87. Dewey, BWT , 68-72 . 
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Development of Reflective Thinking . Reflective 
thinking is not an inborn habit but is developed and 
cultivated. lt is true that everyqne is thinking about 
something all the t1me, but reflective thinking involves 
awarenes ~ of the problem and a definite attempt to solve 
the problem. Th nking, instead of reachin the higher 
stages and becoming reflective t h ought, tends to go astrar 
at the lower levels. ince one's thoughts rule his body, 
it is necessary for one to control hi s thoughts.88 The 
ordinary condi tions of life tend in a limited way to 
discipline one's thinking, but are not sufficient by them-
selves. De ey 1 sts John Locke' s classes of men whose 
thoughts have gone wrong. The fir t class is composed or 
those that depend on others to do their thinking !or 
them; the second class are those that use r eason only for 
their self-inter st; and the t h ird group is composed ot 
those that sincerely follow reason but have not a full 
vie of all that r lates to the question.89 
Since it is so easy !or thought to go astray and 
for false inferences to be made, it is necessary to prove 
every inference. The means or proof are experimental and 
test and try out e~ery inference. If an inference can 
stand under the severPst tests, then there is no good 
88. Dewey, HWT, 18-19. 
89. Dewey, HWT, 23. 
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reason for further doubting it. Reflective thinking di -
tinguishes bet een beliefP that rest upon tes ted ev dence 
and t hose t hat do not.90 The formation of t he habits 
that lead to reflective thi nking is developed by the 
tra n1n of the mi nd. There is no easy way or short cut 
to r flective thinking. 
Now that the need tor reflective thi nking hes been 
di scu sed, it seems wise to discuss t he natural resources 
in the traini ng of t hought, Traini1~ falls back upon the 
direct i on of natural po ers of thought, but doesn't create 
t he pow r of thought. In order th t one may be able to 
test the validi ty o f a uggestion, he must have a fund 
of experience and f acta from which suggestions proceed, 
a flexibility and freshness of suggestions, and the ability 
to apply in an orderlv and consecutive ay hat i s sug-
gested. 91 
There i s no th ught without the gathering o r f·cts, 
but reflective thought goes deeper than the gathering of 
fac~ Thinking i s t he order ng of subject matter with 
reference to d1 covering what it i gni f ies or indicates . 
Reflect~ve thi nktng invol ves both t he unconscious and the 
consc ious. A oorreot and proper balano must be e. tab-
lished b tween th se two phases of the mental life. 
90. Dewey, HWT, 27, 
91. De ey, HWT, 30. 
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"Unconsciouene a gives spontaneity and freshness, con-
sc i ousness, conviction and control."92 
4. Jud.gm nt 
Aft~r a consideration of reflective thinking, it would 
b ise to cons der the idea of judgment since the judg-
ment is the r .eult or thought. «ithout thought it is 
impossible to come to a judgment. It 1s b y the process 
of thought that the result (the judgment) is reached. 
Judgments in more complex roblems can only be reached by 
reflective thought. A judgment or reflect ve thought is 
more apt to be accurate than a judgment baaed upon thought 
at a lower level. 
What it is. Runes • diction ry gives the following 
definition of judgment: . "The mental act of asserting 
(afflrming or denying) an assert ble content ••• "93 Dewey 
states that judgm nt has been analyzed to show that it is 
a continuous process of resolving an indeterminat e , un• 
settled situation into determinately unified one, 
through operations h1ch transfor m ubject matter originally 
g1ven.94 In the book, How We Think, Dewey speaks of 
judgment as the interpretation of the facts. 
Its Historical Development 
Since Hegel left a permanent influence upon Dewey's 
92. D ey, HWT, 217. 
93 . Charles A. Bayl6s in Runes, (ed.), DOP, 157. 
94 . De ey, LTI, 283. 
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thought, 1t might be ell to a e ~hat he thought in 
regard to judgment. He states that Hin the judgment the 
implicit un .ty in which the mov menta are grasped to-
gether in the comprehension is cane lled.n95 B gel con-
siders judgment in the field of logic and di cusses its 
d1ffer nt aspects in logic. He divides the judgment 
into hree parts. Th~ first i the subject as the side 
of individuality or part1.cularity; the second is the 
predicate as the side or universality, hich is at the 
same time n d termin d universality; and the third is 
the eo ula, which i s the simple relation that the subject 
has to the predicate. Judgm nt brings the ext@rnal re-
lation of subject and pred1cate into an internal r ela-
tion of comprehension.95 Hegel peaks ot the syllogism 
as the judgment ith i t s gr ound • Hegel divides f ormal 
logic into comprehension, judgment, and the syllog1sm.96 
Judgment: 11 The Interp retation of Factstt . Judgment 
involves thre factor. These rea controversy ~ith 
opposite claims, A process ot elabor ting these claims, 
and the fin 1 d cision aettlin the part icular matter. 
Before on need to make a judgm nt, t ere mus t be some 
uncertainty--some problem that arises. The judgment de-
fines t he tssu and in or der to make judgment, one must 
95 . Hegel, SRL, 126. 
96 . H g 1, S •'L, 71 . 
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first or all select what facts are evidence.97 There 
are no hard d SPt rules for t he select on or r jeot1on 
of facts, but this must be done by every individual for 
himself . ~his makes judgment a relative standard r ther 
than n objective one. In order to make a judgment, the 
nece sary and aDproprlate rinciples must also be selected. 
One doesn't a preach any problem with a uurely objective 
outlook, but has Rome subjective bias. As one compiles 
and correlates the data according to his principles, he 
forms a dec1s1 n. A d c1e1on concludes the question end 
1 a judgment. 98 
De y n xt considers the origin and natur of 
ideas in relation to judgment. Id as are meanings tenta-
tively set forth in or dgr to dev lop judgments. De y 
ould limit 1deas to tools in reflective examination of 
a problem. By the process of analysi ; judgment clarifies 
confused data. 1'here is also n el(>-ment of synthesis in 
judgment . This is the r evealing or bearing of facts. 
These analytic and synth~tic vie s of jud ment are not 
contradictory, but hould be resolved into each ot er . 
D ey states that danelys1s leads to yn esi , wh11 
synthesis perfects analysi ."99 
97 . Dewey, IIWT, 103. 
98 . De ey , H' T, 105-107. 
99. De ey, HWT, 115. 
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Judgment: t1Log1o--ThP- Theory of Ingu:try". Dew y 
carries on and develops th ideas on judgment that he 
s t forth in 1910. In hie book on log o 1n 1936 h s ts 
forth in more than a hundre pages h re ant viev1 of 
judgment. He starts out by notin th construction of 
judgment. lie distinguishes between judgment and ropos:t• 
t1on and state that judgm nt "has direct x stenti 1 
import."lOO The propositionn are advanced about the state 
of facts involved, wbil~ the judgment s t he outcome of 
inquiry. 
Judgnent may be divid d into t o d vi ions--ad-judgment 
and final judgm nt. Ad- judgm nt is t he appraisal of the 
propo ition an data, wbil final juogment is the clim&tic 
ju gment and ia developed from th propo it1ons not re-
jected by ad-judgment. Dewey follows Hegel 1n rejecting 
the view that the judgment is simpl y predicating ometh1ng 
about he subject. D way objects to the old idea of re-
garding the ubject as eternal and changeless. This once 
more shows the Hegelian vi wpo nt of 1alect1cal regress. 
In carrying out this R gelian viet of constant nroces 101 
Dewey objects to making the pred1cat the final criterion 
of truth or as rtib111ty.l02 Final judgment is attained 
100. Dewey, LTI , 120. 
101. e ey, LTI, 140. 
102. Dewey, LTI, 131. 
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through a series of part al judgm~nt s . ~he subject-
predicate is a provisional distinction. Because there is 
continuity in inquiry, there are no self-evident truths 
immediately known. Dewey states that the denial of the 
existence of immediate knowledge does not deny the facts 
cited to support the theory of mmediate knowledge but 
g ives a different interpretation of these facts.l03 
From the construction or judgment Dewey t akes up next 
the judgments of practical evaluation. Dewey considers 
declarative proposi tions instruments i n the control of 
transforming subj ect matter. He states h i s position in 
t hi a manner a 
All controlled inqu ry and all institutions 
of gr ounded assertion necessarily cont ain a practi-
cal factor; an act t vity of do ing and making which 
reshapes antecedent exi!t~nti al material wh ch seta 
the problem of inouiry. -0 
Dewey considers that judgment has the double character of 
pro~isional appraisal or estimate and a conclusive aspect. 
~very complex inquiry is marked by a seri es o f stages that 
are relative completions. Thus every temporal judgment is 
a complete judgment in one s ens e, while every complete 
judgment is the basi s of later judgment, s o in that s ense 
it is temporary. Dewey is a ttempting to make t he concep-
tions of judgment conform to the r eality ot scientific 
103. Dewey, LTI, 141. 
104. Dewey, LTI, 160. 
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praot1ce .l05 
Dewey next considers the function of propoRitions of 
quantity in judgment. He first of all attempts to indicate 
more explicitly the connection of quant i tative t~rms with 
comparison. One of the basic problems in the formation of 
final judgments is to determine just what subject matter 
nee ns to be eliminated. ~ difference between s c ience and 
common s ~nse in this regard may be noted in that science 
gives Rumerical comparisons. Thus science tri es to tell 
f rom experiment ation what data are necessary and what can 
be eliminated. De •ey recognizes the fact tha t the idea of 
measurement s dependent upon some standard of value. He 
is not w lling to accept the idea of absolute standards and 
spends a conside r able portion of his chapter on quantity 
and measurement in an attempt to set forth the concepts of 
relative s t andarda .l06 
It might be well to paua e and consider Dewey 1 s posi-
t i on. It all s tandards are relative, then how can there be 
anything that is final? The term final judgment loses it 
meaning and becomes on y a r elative judgment, not n final 
juqgment. Another object ion to the idea of relative stand• 
ard is that if a standard is r elative, is it a real standard? 
If the standard is only relative, it i s not a standard and 
105 . Dewey , LTI , 186-190. 
106. Dewey, LTI, 213-215. 
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is only a tentative value. A relative standard does away 
with the possibility of knowing permanent values. It one 
grants permanent value , it would seem that t here must be 
permanent judgmsnts (that judge the values) and permanent 
standard. Dewey would answer the objecti on by saying that 
real values are not cont ingent upon kno ledge but endur 
whether one is sure of their val dity or not. It may be 
true that many standards and values are not absolute, but 
this doe s nd establish the t ct that there can be no perma-
nent or absolute s tandard. De ey cannot say that ther~ can-
not be any pe rmanent value for if he would affirm thi he 
would become an absolutist (in a nega tive sense). · 
Judgm nt is the changing of an indeterminate situation 
into a determined one. whatever ex sts in judgment is 
temporal-spatial det rm1nation .l07 Dewey thinks th t one 
must notice the di r f eronce bet een the existence of change 
a s barely existent i al and a the subject matter of judg-
ment; otherwise the nature or an ev nt becomes an inexpllca-
ble mystery. Dewey in r emaining consistent with his view 
ot a r lative standard cons iders the dating or events as 
the particular occurrence or that event in relation hip to 
. 
other events. What is hap ening at this minute is an ab-
solute 1 ea, en one cannot experie~ce anything not in time. 
From tbe~ data the 1 ea or an absolute standard 6 n be 
107. Dewey, LTI, 220•230. 
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developed. 
Dewey divides judgment into events that occurred in-
side pPrsonal recollections and those t hat occurred outside. 
From tact~ gathered, onP may make int ranees about some 
events that happen outside our recollection and may estab-
lish what the probable event was. In order that one may 
establish a historical judgment, he must make a ground d 
propo tion regarding a course or past events. To develop 
this grounded historical judgment, he must see thFt the 
data are reliable and authentic. All historical construc-
tion 1s necessarily selective.l08 
Profea or Dewey considers next the continuum or judg-
ment. He stArts out by saying that "e.xp~r1ence has temporal 
continu ty.nl09 He thinks that an experiential continuum 
which has been established by both biological and cultural 
conditions is reflected in the process or inquiry. No 
judgment is isolated rrom hat went on before or came after-
wards . Ideas are inter rated through a common factor called 
recurrence. The problem as Dewey sees it is how that re~ 
currence takes place. One must be careful to note the dif-
ference between so entific inquiry and formation or common 
sense expectations. 
Dewey teels that his theory of the general is a syn-
108. Dewey, LTI, 205. 
109. Dewey, LTI, 245. 
72 
thesis of ro 11 m, cone ptual1sm, and nominal i sm. It 
agree with r aliam in the interpretation that generals 
"in aff irming ways or acting tu~e as exist~nt al as are 
singular events and objecta.nllO He di sagrees ith real-
ism on the view of interact on which he is illing to 
affirm 1 ways of acting but s not a sufficient condition 
of logical gen ral1ty. He agrPes ith nominalism in hold ~ ng 
that only by the immediate qualities can one determine 
spec f _o generality. Dewey differs from nominalism by 
holding that symbolization is a neoea ary condition of all 
inquiry. Dewey's view agrees with oonoeptualiam in that it 
considers the general as ideational 1n nature, but differs 
as to what conceptions intrinsically are.lll 
Nature of Truth 
What it s. Th re has b en a limited study of truth 
in the third cha ter, but the subject of truth has some fund-
amPntal implic tiona in its relation to judgment. When is 
a judgm~nt a correct judgment? De vey holds that truth is 
the ef f ctive orking of an idea; indeed t he effectual work-
ing of an idea and ta truth are one and the same thing.ll2 
Truth ia not someth ing static but ia al ays changing be-
cause 1 t s baaed on experience. 'l'ruth to a pragmatist is 
110. De ey, LTI, 262-263. 
111. Devey , LTI, 262-263. 
112. Ratner, JDP, 167. 
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in a stage of constant flux. When is a judgment valid and 
truthful and when is it false is a real problem to Dewey. 
Afftrmation and ne&ation. Dewey finds a defini te con-
trast between the tradttional theory of positive and nega-
tive propositi0ns and hat occurs in the conduct of inquiry. 
D wev thinks that modern science has destroyed the Aristo-
telian concept of an absolute s t and rd and absolute truth, 
so a nAw view of truth must be estsbl iahed.ll3 Dewey con-
siders affirmation and negation as conjugate. He considers 
truth as the functional office it exero sea in inquiry. 
Dewey in hi s later years didn't fully grasp the Hegelian 
dialectic when he says that the ntsynthesia' grows directly 
out of the contraries ••. "114 Hegel never taught that the 
synthesis comes "directly" from the thesis and antithesis, 
but rather that th~ synthests comes from the thesis and 
ant1theaiR but 1s somAthing different from the sum total 
of its parts. 
How truth is f ound. After one forms a judgment how 
may he know if it is true? One must test the judgment to 
see if it is true. "The original of truth is verification 
and ita most extended meaning is verification. nll5 Truth 
is found by testing and by public verification. Does a 
thing work? If so, it must be true. Truth is not an innate 
113. Dewey, LTI, 182. 
114. Dewey, LTI, 192. 
115. 1.1l1am Saver in Sch1.lp (ed.), .PJD, 486. 
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tendency or en absolute !.de a , bu t ia rE\l ot t ve and can only 
be found by strict adherence t o the sc1ent1f1c method of 
thought. By careful study and hard rork one ia able to ftnd 
:relat ive truth. Abgolut~= truth may exist, but if 1 t does, 
it h s not yet been f ound .ll6 Tbe pragmatic test of truth 
is its workability. Dewey does not rna e a dist~nct1on be-
tween orkab1li t y in a logi cal sense (meeting the conditions 
of warrant€'0 sert1.bili t y ) and '!J: orkability in a Psychologi-
cal or in a politic 1 . ense. PB1loso here in general ro tad not 
object t o t he us~ of orkab ility in logic sonae as a t est 
of truth but ould not u worka il!ty in ~ ol tical sen e. 
A distinction, not m de by De1ey, hould be made bet een the 
warran ted asaertibility of a t hing and it consequences . 
116 . Dewey, Art.(l946), 538. 
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Chapter V 
ATURE AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledgea Definition. The problem of this chapter 
18 to study Dewey's views on the nature and theory of 
knowledge. The method of approach 111 be first of all to 
def ne the terms, then give the historical development, 
from there go into a study of realism and idealism, and 
f nally go into a study of monism and dualism. The first 
term that n ads definition is knowledge. Dewey concludes 
in an article in 1947 that the term knowledge is too broad 
es it is gener lly used.ll7 It is necessary to define what 
is meant by knowledge before the term can be used intelli-
gently. Feibleman defines kno ledge as: 
Relations known. Apprehended truth. Opposite 
of opin ~ on. Certa in kno ledge is more than opinion, 
less than truth. Theory of knowledge, or episte-
mology ••• is the systematic 1.nveat1gat1on and exposit-
ing of the principles or the possibility of kno ledge.ll8 
For Dewey the idea leads to the act; therefore, the 
idea is the instrument bringing knowing into being.ll9 
Knowledge is the act which confirms the objective r ference 
of the idea or aymbol.120 Dewey limits knowledge and 
speaks of knowledge a8 apprehension. "It is seizing or 
grasping, intellectually, 1thout question1ng."l2l He 
117 . Dewey, Art.(l947), 428. 
118. James R. Feib1eman in Hunes {ed.), OP, 161. 
119. Ratner {ed.), JDP, 1~3. 
120. Dewey, LTI, 135. 
121. Dewey, LTI , 143. 
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also recognizes that knowledge has two basic meanings. 
In 1.ts first and · tr ctest sense it i s dent1cal with 
warranted assertion. It can al o mean the understanding 
or an act called auprehension.l2l 
In 1917 Dewey felt that the term knowledge could be 
defined and that one must dec de what is kno ledge before 
any constructive work in the fi eld or education could be 
done. In the book, Democracy and ~ducation, Dowev at-
tempts to give a definition of knowledge. He defines it 
as "the description of the things t hat exist. Knowledge 
is a double or that whi ch is. ''122 This is dualistic and 
is considered the more common defini tion of knowledge, but 
Dewey is inclined to prater a second and more pragmatic 
definition of knowledge which states that "knowledge is 
not our awareness or the things that exist; it is our 
ability to work with them."l22 He uses the term kno ledge 
in the second sense in the book, Democracy and Education. 
Intelligence. There is a definite relationship be• 
tween intellig~nce and instrumentalism in Dewey 1 s thought. 
Wood statess 
In Dewey, intelligence is t he bas i c instrument, 
to be contrasted ith fixed habit, traditional 
customs, and -the sheer force ot political or bu-
reaucratic power as means of settling social issues.l23 
121. Dewey, LTI, 143. 
122. Dewey, DA~, 388. 
123. Ledger Wood in Runes (ed.), DOP , 147. 
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Instrumentalism. Intelligence is definitely con-
nected with instrumentalism, and in order that one might 
grasp a clear idea of what inte l ligence is it is neces" 
sary to define instrumentalism. 
Instrumentalism: In the philosophy of De vey in-
strumentalism is scarcely distl nguished from experi-
mentalism, or operationalism, although it is used 
t o characterize h1a earlier ph lo ophy and i , in 
its associations, more closely rel ated to evolution-
ary ph loso hy, and more influenced by biological, 
than by physical or social science.l24 
Dewey prefers the term "instrumentalism" over "prag-
matism" because he considers h is philosophical system a 
pur uit of truth or t he instrument that may lead to truth 
rather than a system in which the truth is .t nally pos~ 
sese d. Hi s ystem is supposed to l ead to truth, so he 
t hink that it will not become outdated as have the oth r 
systems t h at profess to have truth. 
2. Historical Develooment 
Early years. Dewey starts out , as is noted 1n th 
introduction to this thesis, to be an ideal i st. He s tates 
that "id alism is not a proces . of departure from the ma~ 
terial presented in perception for t his material s it-
self ideal."125 In th , same article he s ays t hat "self-
consoiousne a is simply the conscious recogni tion that 
t he ideal element 1s involved in all knowledge together 
124. v. J. McGill 1n Runes (ed.), DOP, 247. 
125. Dewey, Art.(1887)l, 390. 
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with what is implied in this s ta tement."l26 
At th s time Dewey considered himself an absolute 
idealist. He was opposed to subjective idealism b cause 
it did. n~ present a unified vie or the relation of the 
subject and object. At the same time he was opposed to 
r asoned r lism because 1t used t he ontological method 
rather than the psychological method.l27 
Dewey believed that nothing was to be admitted nto 
phi losophy that doe s:not shm 1 taelf in consc ous e:xper-
lance. · He considered that psychology was the scientifi c 
and systematic account of this experience. !he account 
of the process of knowledge as to be established by pay-
chology and h ent so far as to limit all kno~ledge to 
t hat which originates from sensations. He did distnguish 
between sensations and the senses however. In this view 
t he senses are not knowledge but the result of knowledge 
and all knowledge is relative.l28 
In 1887 De ey wrote an article on "Knowledge as 
Idealism". In t his he pre ented the thought that the 
id a implies both existence and meaning. Perceiving was 
not a clust ring of feelings but perceiving was inter-
pretation. He believed t hat what 'as immediately present 
126. ewey, Art.(l887), 396. 
127. Dewey, Art.(1886), 12. 
128. Dewey, Art.(l886), 32-7. 
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was never known. 129 Dewey defined perception as uncon-
scious r~ soning and sets for~h the idea that "reasoning 
is the way in which we separate and unite meaning into 
one com lox meaning . ttl:30 
In 1891 De ey wrote an ar·ti cle on logical theory in 
which he ve his opinion o K nt and Hegel. He thought 
that he h d t aken from Kant the idea that thought apart 
from f ct was urely analytical. One was not able to 
arr _ve at truth or tPat the truth of such k i nd of thinking. 
He believed that Hegel went even farther than Kant nd 
denied the possibility of getting truth from formal thought 
apart from experience. From this empirical basi Dewey 
d nied the possibility of valid t hought transcending ex-
perience. There could be no correct thought that was other 
than the exprossion of xperienced facts. For this reason 
he objected to speculation an b~li ved that a time w a 
coming when ph1lo ophy oulli !Pave i t s vain specullil.t1ons 
and accep t the p rticular t h ese or . os t1ve science.l:31 
I n 1904 Dew y at temp ts to define the term •41dean. In 
it or1g nal meaning he b liev~d that it w a objective and 
related to the t'latonic idea . He thought that it did~not 
have any ychological or conceptual meaning attached. to it. 
He then went on to give a list of other meanings tor the 
129. Dewey, Art.(l887 ), 384-385 . 
130. Dewey, Art. (lA87), 386. 
131. Dewey, Art. (1891), 13. 
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term nidea". A mere idea is th uproduct of pure mental 
activity out loose trom any obj ect, t he idea as t he affair 
of arb itrary imag1. nation."l32 In its r elation to truth 
the idea wa t he fact in the mind (the definition of idea 
t hat Dewey used was that t he 1d a as a "ment al stat fluctuat-
ing to any object in any phaa n .l32 
By 1905 Dewey s eemed t o hav e gone from idealism to 
real i m. He stated, "Presuppositions and t ndencie of 
pragmat ism are dist i nctly real istic; not idealistic in any 
sense i n hich i d al1sm connot s." l33 He went on to explain 
this and say that "id as, sensations, ment al sta es a r e, 
i n their cogni tive aign1f1canoe, media of adjusting things 
to one ~noth r, that they become representative of. one 
another. "134 Thus from thes e statements it can eas Uy b · 
seen tha t Dewey cons dared i nstrument liam as thoroughly 
realistic. He concluded th article by t lling what rag-
atiam has tak n from id~aliam . The only t h ing th t prag-
matism has t n from idealism 1.s "just and only empir1oism" .l35 
Immediate mp1rici po . tuls t e the idea that t he things--
any one of th thinge-•are just hat they are experienced 
e.s. Reality i s just what it is kno n to be. When someone 
by the cl s to 1 use of i llu ions argues against reality 
132. De ey, Art (1904 )2 , 176-178 . 
133. Dewey , Art.(l905), 324. 
134. D wey, Art.(l905}, 325. 
135. Dew y, Art.(l905 ), 397. 
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being what is experienced, Dewey answers that an illusion 
" is that e:xperienoe which it is e.nd no other."l35 When one 
takes this view then it may be asked how can on i nte rpret 
experience. Does not one have to go beyond bat is exper· 
ienced to interpret a thing? If there is no kno ledge beyond 
what is experienced, then how could one interpret his first 
experiences? There must be something in t e mind that enables 
it to interpret the experiences. If mind is only a blank 
blackboard that record ex eriencea then .it i not able to or-
ganize these experiences or interpret them. 
Dewey would answer this by s aying that the problem of 
what is in the minct at the first experience is irrelevant to 
the study of knowledge. One ob erveA that he does experience 
and interprets his experiences by other experiences. Under 
this a comprehensive view of experience is demanded that 
includes more than the direct experience of things. The 
que t!on is not how does one eYperience the f irst things but 
does he experience them. De ey's attempt to ignore this 
problem does not answer it, however. 
Continuing on in 1906 with h a emphasis on reality as 
experience De ey dealt with the problem of how the world 
co l d have existed before there was consci ous organism. 
Without conscious organism there was not any experience, yet 
there w reality. Be answers this by saying "it i a sit-
uation of which , by scientific warrant, 1t al aye is to be 
135 . Dewey, Art.( l 905); 397. 
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said t h t it 1s on 1t sy to the pre ant situation; that 
is, to exoar ence, and that th. s way is its o n way.nl36 
Dewey also mphasized that you must consider the whole and 
not tnke r~ality at any on point. He answered the qu ~tion 
ot ho e lity can exist ithout experienc by say ng that 
it existed by v rtue of future exporienoe. Th1s int rpr ta-
t1on leads to a def nita m ohan1st1c ph11oso hy. Everything 
must be or dered or else one co ldnot have been sure that 
experience as going to follo r~ . ity. This ame year 
ewey began to emphasize the experimGntal theory of knowl dge. 
In the same year--1906--Dewey rote a s ries of rt1 -
clos n the hilosoph·tcal Rev:le on experience and tte 
r latton to obj cttve idealism. He believed that the s Ub-
ject va form of idealism claimed the 1 st word of empiricism 
h .-le th r tional form empha~ized the w rk or thought and 
su plied. the factors f object! v ty lacking in en at1onal-
1sm. Ideal sm according to De1ey is half o posed to, half 
co itted to, emptrtctsm. He th u~ht that objective id.e limn 
must turn to thorough-going em-oir1oism. l 37 Kno ledge we. 
on~y opin on . He believed t hat i dealism led to a vi w or 
perception an obsArv t1on that could not rive en ad quate 
basis of knowledge. Dewey also set fort the problem of 
significance of perception and conception in r s ect to 
136 . De ey, Art.{l906)2, 253. 
137 . Dewey, Art .(l906)4 , 465 . 
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experience. 
In t his s er ies of articles D wey he taken a vi w 
t hat was o posite to his realistic vi w and held to the 
ideas of objective idealism. Idealism to h1m was the 
sponsor tor all significance, identity, purposeJ located 
in pure conception. ~he const i tution of idealism gave 
' 
ob jectivity to empirical data. Dewey considered that or-
ganization was not the work or r eason but of experience. 
Through experience systemati zed errangemants were orked 
out. 1 38 He then went into a study of the relation or 
conceptual to perceptual data. He beli ved that ex er-
ience plus its psychological interpr.etation showed t hat 
perception was primarily en act or adjustment. Percep• 
tion finds its end in an improved function empirici sm. 
He defines psychology as a "natural h story or what at 
any given time passes tor knowledge-•logio--consc ous 
control in the direction or grounded assurance."l39 
From the 's t andpoint of memory, experience present it-
self as .a .multiplicity of episodic events--with enough 
continuity to sugges t all the rinciples of a hole. 
Dewey dealt wi th immediate experi ence an said t hat 
knowledge was one mode of experiencing. '!•he question 
that philosophy sought to answer was hat kind of exper• 
138. Dewey, Art.(l906)4, 471. 
139 . Dewey, Art.(l906)4; 476. 
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ience was knowledge. Truth for Dewey was not what was 
experienced but what was the pragmatic worth of the ex-
perienced thing. The postulates of empiricism do not 
contain philosophical propositions but lay down a method 
of phil osophical analysis .l40 
In 1907 Dewey began to develop his t heories of ad-
justment and problem solving. He said that agre ement with 
reality is t he same as success or adjustment. The practi-
cal ha s no refe rence to any fixed utility . The reflective 
situation is the meaning approp r iate to t he management or 
development of a troubled situation and thus is problem 
solving. 
Summary of th . early period- Dewe~r s tarted out a s 
an absolute ideal ist . As he developed his idealism he 
bel ieved t hat the empirical method was the only app ro ach 
to phtloao hy. As the empirical approach developed i n 
Dewey's thought he found s defini te attrRction in real-
ism as over again~t ideal1sm. At other timP.s he wrote as 
if he were still an idealist rather t han a reali st. In 
this period of hi~ thought he d i d not consistently hold 
to either idealism or realism. 
Middle. neriod. He continued his study of experience 
in 1910 in an article on "Valid Knowledg and the Sub-
jectivity of xper1enoe. " He thought that objective 
140. Martin, Art.(l906)~, 350. 
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idealism point to the limitation ot experience. Sino 
exp r1enoe was subjective, it could.D6t be the ultimate 
criterion without subjective philosophy.l41 De ay· at-
tempted to show the r ealist that it experience as sub-
jective then . o a valid judgment. The subjectivity or 
exp rience as a factor that Dewey didn6t recognize in 
his e rlier d ys. At this time ewey believed that ex-
periences boar rel tion to valid knowledg • He thought 
that philosophy had experi enc~d an ant1~1ntellectual 
movement which he spoke or as pragmatism. 
He recognized two t ypes or pragmatism. The firRt 
type was akin to Briti h nominalism and from the stand-
point of knowledg sho s the presence of non-rational 
factor in the knowledge structure. The s econd typ 
of pragmatism was the instrumental pragmatic schoo~ or 
the school ~f De y-•Ohicago. This school teaches that 
-1 both acts and functions are primary data. The functions 
ar e both biolo~ical end social in character and kno ledg• 
comes from these primary functiona. l42 
Dewey gave his objections to rationalism and be• 
lieved that rationalism gnored the significance of 
knowledge a natural event in relation to other natural 
event • H lao taught that rationalism ignored the prob-
141. De vey, Jrt.(l9l0) 2, 170. 
142. De ey, Art.(l910)2, 478•479 . 
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lem of getting knowledge to pass from doubt and guesswork 
to grounded concluaions.l43 Dewey thought that Darwin 
grounded h a evolutionary theory on a pragmati c basis. 
Besides this interest in pragmatism his interest in 
realism nd i dealism continued. Dewey wrote another arti-
cle called, ••The Short Cut to Real am l!ixamined." In this 
art i cle he dealt with thA r elation which the terms held 
for each other. In the connotation and denotation the 
logical content referred to is unmodified by such ref-
erence. He then went on to analyze the idea of the 
connotation and taught that 1f it was the connotation that 
sho ed the relation whi ch holds the terms together, then 
the knowledge was not affected by ita relation and if 
t he doctrine doea not undergo change then the active pro-
cess or inquiry was false. On the other hand 1f the rela-
tion was expressed in the denotation, then 1t comes close 
to the idea that knowledge was accidental and was not the 
normal i ncident in the h story of existence.l44 
Summary of the middle period. Dewey carried on his 
study of experience that he started earlier in hi s life. 
He came to the conclus i on that experience was subjective. 
It was 1n t his period that Dewey recognized the importance 
of pragmatism. He felt that Darwin's theories ware ba~ed 
143. Dewey, Art.(l910)3, 556. 
144. Dewey, Art.(l910)3, 553-567. 
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on pragmatism. Not only was Dewey interested in pragmatima 
but he continued to be interested in the roblems of realism 
and idealism. 
Modern times. In 1920 Dewey s tated t hs t the chief 
function of philosophy "is to free men 's minds f rom bias 
and prejudice and to enlarge their perceptions of the world 
about t hem."l45 This tor him was one of the important 
functions of knowledge. Knowledge for the experimental 
science meant a certain kind of int ell igently conducted do-
ing and was in a true sense practical. To be kno ledge it 
mu t be practical. Knowledge has operated in an important 
sense and ided men's minds in conduct. Th· s guiding 
prino ple s hows the activity and practicality of kno l edge. 
This experimental-practical character of knowledge becomes 
an integral part of the general theories of epistemology . 
There is a need to correlate and bring all knowledge into 
functional relationship.l46 
Ratner states that t he "fundamental idea, then, is that 
the p rimary subject matt r ot philosophic inquiry is a con-
tinuously inter-connected field of experience. nl 47 1be only 
way one can gain kno ledge is to a proach all problems em• 
pirically. The empirical attitude means that the problems 
in philosophy are common problems taken from common exper-
145. Dewey, ROP, 26. 
146 . Dewey, ROP, 64-65. 
147. Hatner (ed.), PJD, 50. 
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ience. Experienc is the true source or kno ledge. Ratner 
states, 
h nee hen he LDewe~7 concerns himself ith the general 
probl m of knowledge he proceeds with the firm nd 
bas c underst nding that h s ~olution of that problem, 
the ge r 1 formations he reaches must be such that 
they ill include, not exclude, will account for, not 
r nder unaccountable the actual ways or knowledge 
which occur.l48 
Summary of modern times. To enlarge man ' s perceptions 
of the world wa one of the functions of knowledge. The 
practical a p ct or knowledge as emphas zed at this time. 
The only true source or kno ledge is experience. 
Contrast of oer iods . Dewsy hns shown a trend from 
object v idaalism to an undetermined state between rflal1sm 
and idealism. As his thought has developed he has held to 
the empirical method as the only source or knowledge. Dur-
ing the middle period hi first emphasis of pragmatism 
developed. The practical aspect or knowle ge wa. developed 
during th modern period. 
3. Realism vs. Idealism 
De ey has not tried o develop a yst ematic theory of 
knowledge . He feels tha t ay~tematization tends to date an 
idea and thus the idea becomes old. Nowhere is this lack 
or systematizati on seen more cle rly than when one tries to 
understand D wey 1 s position in relation to realism ~nd deal• 
sm, in the fie l d of epistemol ogy . This epistemological 
148 . Ratner (ed.), PJD, 56 . 
89 
controversy has been going on sinoe the time of Plato. Dewey 
seems sometimes to be a realist and sometimes to be an ideal-
1st. Lovejoy take< great delight in aho ing tle inconsistencies 
of Dewey's sys tem and has written an art!cl called "The Prag-
matic versus the Pragmatist. " 
Idealism. Dewey started out aR an id a1 6 s t in his 
early philosoohical t hought . This ideal st o trend ha been 
traced elsewhere in t h i s thesis. One f act t hat has not been 
cl arly presented else here in the t hesis 1 th clearly ideal-
ist ic tend~ncy tha t is st i l l p resent in r ewey's thought. This 
tendency i s not clearly recognized by mRny peo 1 • It i more 
commonly thought by many that Dewey full y abandoned h. a f ormer 
idealtstic position. 
The present idealist ic tend ncy in Dewey can be a en in 
many ouotationa t aken from his writ t ngs . De ey takes an ideal-
istic apnroach and s ays that knowledge is one ~orle of experience.l49 
Thi s ex erience is conscious experience. , !nee knowledge is a 
mode of consc_ou s expo rience, it is i dealistic. Th s same idea 
is confirmed in 1910 wlen ho says that "like kno ledge , truth 
is an exp rienoed r elation of t hings, ann it has no meaning 
apart from such relntion."150 In the s me ye r Dewey felt that 
fee s without the i deal as_ ect lack something. Facts are art of 
reality but onl . part. The idea 1s a rml part of real1ty. 151 
149. Dewey, Art.(l906)2, 476. 
150 . Dewe , JDP, 95 . 
151. De ey, Art.(l906), 310. 
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Again Dewey argues against realism when he says that 
"ir reality is just reali ty there isn't any difference be-
tween reality and appearance.nl51 Since Dewey believes t hat 
there is a dist inct i on between these t wo it would seem as 
if he tended towards idealism. Again he says t hat "sensation-
alistic empiricism" and "transcendentalism" are both alike 
in error because "both of these systems tall back on some• 
thing which i s defined in non•d1rectly•exparienced terms 
in orde r to jus tify that which is directly exper1enced.nl52 
One more quotat ion wil l suffice to give t he i deal i stic 
tendency in Dewey. 
Er ror as wel l as truth i s a necessary function of 
kno ing. But the non- empirical ac count or thi s 
transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts all the 
error in one place (our knowledge) and all the truth 
in another (absolute consci ousness or else a thi ng-
in-itself).lo3 
Realism. Dewey early in his philosophical career 
was dissatisfied w1th sub jective i deali sm. He held to 
absolute i dealism but not sub j ective. His objecti on to 
subjective idealism was that it did.mt account for the 
whole of conscious experience. As long as Dewey held to 
the psychological approach to philoso hy he had to reject 
realism since he bel ieved that the r alista developed t heir 
views by t he use of the ontological method rather than the 
151. Dewey, Art.(l906), 310. 
152. Dewey, LTI, 182. 
153. Dewey, JDP, 227. 
91 
psyoholog1oal.l54 Later he left the psychological method. 
The decline of the influence of the psychological is traced 
in Chapter Two of this thesis. In 1905 De ey rot an arti-
cle called "The Reality of Pragmatism." In this article he 
states that the "presupnositions and tendenc es ot pragma-
tism are distinctly realistic; not idealistic in any sense 
in which idealism connotes or is connected by the theory of 
knowledge."l55 In the same article he states that "'reality.' 
is only and just· what they ,4the people experiencing it7 know 
it. to· be • • • n156 That same year he decides ths.t objective 
idaa l ism breaks with open facts in that it recognizes no 
intermediate in a brutally achieved embodiment or meaning.l5'7 
Relationship between realism and idealism. In dif• 
ferent articl s Dewey has argued tor the different posit i ons. 
Dewey's lack of interest in the systematization of one's be-
liefs has caused h1m trouble here. It is not as it De ey 
had merely set forth the ideas of either one side or the 
other but rather that he, at diff rent times, has argued for 
both side • This difficulty cannot be resolved by saying 
that it is merely an example of the Hegelian di leoti o and 
that idealism is the thesis and realism the antithesis. It 
this were so, one might ask what s the synthesis that is 
154. De ey, JDP, 227. 
155. Dewey, Art.(1886)1, 12. 
156. Dewey, Art.(l905)l, 324. 
157. Dewey, Art.(l905)2, 395. 
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emerging. De ey, rather than presenting som synthesis, 
still speak of 1dPal1sm and raaliAm and us s the a ter.ms 
in dealing with this particul r problem. One might say 
that both idealism and r aliam are abstractions from the 
total situation in knowledge. 
ey use the t er m pragmatism to designate his ph1l-
oso hical position. He would probably deny that h is either 
an idealist or a reali s t but ould say that h is simpl y an 
instrumentali st.l58 One of the basic contentions of instru-
mentalism is · that it is the empirical approach to ph1losophy.l59 
Since instrumentalism is empirical it must consider what it 
finds regardless of the difficult y that a datum preaants. 
Thus Dewey might say that an empirical ~tudy of epistemology 
would give both idealistic and re listie concepts. He also 
makes a distinction in the purpose ot truth. Be says that 
"the question of truth is not as to whether B ing or on-Being , 
Reality or mere appearance , is experienced, but a to the 
worth or a certain concretely experienced t h1ng . nl60 Truth 
is also spok n or as always changing because it is based on 
experience that is ever-c anging.l61 
nee there is no absolut e standard for truth th r 
can be no way of judging Dewey 's conceptions of rm lism and 
i~~ : yg~Y~ ~;;·l~9~~~ip~8?ed .), PJD; 536 . 
160. n~ ey, JD~, 235. 
161. John Dewey 1n Sohilpp, PJD, 486. 
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idealism upon Dewey' s own tandRrd. No judgment may nroceed 
on a r~lative standard. Dewey recognized the dift oulty 
involved in his d finition of truth and in 1947 spoke of th 
lack or aocuraoy in the technical use or the term truth. 
He state. th t t he mor closely it is examined, it frequently 
hepp ns, th , mor inaccurate t t appears.l62 
It is not possib le to aay that Dewey has synthes i zed 
idealism and rPalism nd that there is2not an anparent oon-
fltot between those v1.ews. lany of his oritios (such as 
Lovejoy) have ointed out the contradict ons in De ey's po-
itions but he has not attempted to reconcile them. Admitting 
that there ar~ oontradtcttons in Dewey's views on idealism 
a s opposed to rAa ism and that his vie of truth makes it 
impos ible to find an objective absolut standard to judge 
his views, 1t is still necessary to see if these contrad1c-
tiona can be resolved. Fir st of all Dewey considers that 
hts method i s the emnirical. This he attributes to ideal-
ism. From this st rting noint he doesmot think that it is 
possible to go further into idealism. at times Dewey i s 
clearly and distinctly a realist and at other times he is an 
idealist. Lovejoy seems to be correct hen he says of this 
same problem when seen from t he passages Dewey seta forth, 
"taking the assagel63 to mean what it clearly seems intended 
l 2 . Dewey, Art . (l947 ), 432. 
163. Dewey, IDP, 157. 
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to say , we have not foun here any means of 1armonizlng Mr . 
Dewey's realistic and idealistic utterance s ••• nl64 
Epistemological Mon1 t~~rn and Due.lism 
It may seem wrong to leave an un olved p roblem to 
go t o anoth r problem. This wo ld seem to be a violation 
of Descartes' pri nci ple of s i mplicity. It cou l be argued 
that br nging t h p~obl .m of monism And dualism into the 
n1o ture may obscure t he i ea of i dealism nnd dualism. This 
i s true, but, on t he other hand, an unsolvable contra-
d ic tion is found t he gathering of matArta l from the relative 
problema may p~es ent some light on the first problem. With 
thi s in mind one can see that a discussion of moni sm and 
dualism is not r unning away from the problem but rather 
faoi g t he problem and s eeking to gather more data in order 
that a solution of the dilemma may be found . 
onism. The monistic view of Dewe7r sho s up only in 
his philosophical thought . In 1886 he set forth the idea 
that there is no duali sm in ps ychology. Th s wa s the time 
tha t he cons:J.dered psychology as the ph i loaonhic me thod.l65 
It is necessary t o di stinguish between me t aphysical and 
epistemological dualism and monism; but when Dewey speaks 
of psychological ualism it should be clear t hat he is 
~peaking of epistemology and not me t ephy ice. In the same 
164 . Lovejoy in Drake, Love j oy, and others, EOR , 47. 
165. Dewey, Art .(1886) 2, 172-173. 
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article he speaks of the psychological standpoint a the 
relation of the subject and object within conaciou ness. 
The problem is wh t 1 the relatton of th thing to it elf. 
Dewey recognized that tho e is a relntion between kno ledge 
and conaciousnes , and that consciouene a is dep endent on 
somet n not it elf. He solve this problem by saying 
t hat t he r al i "not related to consciousness but produces 
both conac1ou nes it elf and the objects hich are r elativ 
to con c ousneas."l66 From th s one oan see that De ey is 
al _ n1n h ms lt with a mon1 tic idealism or agnnstici m. 
He rejects both r~e on d realism b cause it use the onto-
logical approac in.etead of the psychological, and sub ject1 ve 
id al1sm because it doe n't ac cept t he unity of the subject 
end object. As has been p inted out in Chapt r Two, De ' y 
graduall. left many of his 1d as of sychological phil sophy. 
What e ffec t did this ithdrawal have upon his monistic and 
dualistic views? 
By 1903 Dewey had l eft many of his psychological ideas 
in favor of t he new logic. 1n his book, ~tudiea 1n Logical 
Theory, De ey rejected t he dual i stic theory of r eality upon 
the basis that it cannot give a criterion or truth. In ita 
stead Dewey has advoca.ted a monistic view co.lled pragmatism. 
This is an empiric 1 aoproach and makes the usefulnes of nn 
166. De ey, rt.(l886)l, 8-10 . 
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idea the judge of its eorroct nes . • At this time t here 
may seem to be a correspondi ng dualism in t he p ragmat i c 
th~ory of judgments slnce t he judgment refers to t he art 
of the ex erience not at the minute pr ~ent in one's di r ect 
consc ··msness. 
This mon stlc tendency i s carried i nto many of 
Dewe~ 's lat r wr __ tings. In one of his latest art lclee 
he give ~ hi later view of epi stemological dunli • 
There 1~ potential advance contained in the 
p resent concern with language and symbols . But 
t cannot be cerriod i nto ff ect, i t ! s null i f i ed, 
as long as the s hadow of t h e old epistemological 
dichotomy ha g s over ~ - r :t tin that pN>fesae s to be 
log1cal.167 
Duali sm . After fi nding so many clear-cut statements 
1n f~vor of moni . m and since he attacks ual sm so vigor-
ously one ould not expect to find a dualistic tendency 
within the s ame man . It ould seem f rom t~o above state-
menta that Dewey is clearl y a monis t , not "ualiat. Yet 
from h i s views i t can also be shown that he reject ~ both 
a monist ic r ealism and a monistic i dealism. ' hue it seems 
that the only t entat i ve position i s a. dualis ti c position . 
A study of som more quotations i l l tend to develop the 
dual stic tendency in Dowey. 
Objective idealism b r eaks with open f act in t hat 
th~ e iR n intermediate be t een a brutally achieved 
mbodiment of mean1n and a total opposition of the 
167 . Dewey , Art .(l946 ), 94. 
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given and t he i deal connoting that mutual 1nd1ffe r-
ences and incapac1t y .l68 
This uotation shows that De ey rejected 1doal1 sm upon the 
basis t ha t it made the objects and the perce iver t he s ame 
and gave no distinct on nor s howed any intermediate b een 
them. If one accepts this objection it seems as i f only an 
epistemological dualism can develop. 
Lovejoy putR it in very picturesque language hen he 
s ays, If ••• He LDewex7 has a t the outset ~-~ n alarming -air of · 
having come to curse the camp of t he dualists, but in the 
end he r emains to bless it."l69 
From another quotation one can see Dewey's objections 
to monis tic realism. Monistic realism 
assumes that there is the real object ••• ainoe it i s 
~asily demonstrable that t here a a numerical du 11-
ot ty between the as tronomical star and ts effect 
ot vis ible light, the latter evidAntly, when the 
forme r is dubbed "then real object, stands in d. s-
paraging cont rast with its r eality ••• Is not t h most 
plaus i ble account or the difference between the 
physioe. l cau e of the perceptive knowledge and what 
the latter present prec1s ~ly th1 difference--
namely, p resentation to a knower ••• ?l70 
Once more Dewey states th t epistemological dualism 
render the problem or knowledge insoluble. From this he 
goes on and s tates that either both th tact and t he idea 
are present all t he time or else only one or t hem is present . 
168. Dewey, Art.(l906 J4 , 480 . 
169. Lovejoy , in ;Drake, Lovejoy and others, J:<.:CR, 54 . 
170. Dewey, EEL, 254-255. 
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n G ·ealla :tt pi ca of - ork 1n ) ros~nting 
n sid o ow. y ' t hought in a co s 1atr>nt m nn(' r but a. he 
r1 " mself (Lov joy) admits , ha conclusions .lo h n dr wn are 
tho~ htch he nr&gr t"st himself neglects or r fuses to 
dra .175 Love joy b lieves that a. con L tent . rogrnntia . must 
reco~n-tze : 
a . 11 ''inst~ nt lu kno ladg "s, or at leust 
includes a!l'~ rr·"'Uirea 'orese. t at ve 11 knm lee ge , a 
representation of non-pros<~nt xi stonts by pr ent 
data; 
174. Lo e jo;r i n Dr: •ke, Lo ejoy an others , }.Cn , cc . 
1 75 . Love joy in Vrako , Lovojoy end oth~r3 , JO.r , 62 . 
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b. That, pragmatically cons t dered, kno ledge is 
thus nece sar1ly and constantly convers ant with en-
tities which are existentially "transo ndent" of the 
knowing experience, and f requently with entities 
which transcend the total expe rience of t ne kno er; 
c. Th t, if a real physical orl h v1n t he char-
acter! tic a t forth by natur 1 acienoe is a sumed , 
certain of the contents or xperienca, nd specifically 
the content of anticipation and retro pect on, cannot 
be as 1gned t~ th t worl , and must th~r tore be c lled 
"psy~hioal" ~i.e., experiences but not physical enti• 
ti a/; . 
d . Th t kn wledge 1s mediated through such psychical 
ex atences, and woul be impos ble ithout them.l'76 
Lovejoy believes that true pragmatism has no quarrel ~ith 
critical realism. 
By select ng only ome of Dewey's ide a it is possible 
to establish a po t1ve r elationship between critical real-
ism and r gmat1sm. But it should be noted that by t h same 
ap ro ch o ey's epist molog c n be s hown to be ideal stic. 
Thus this method does not give any . ati s t ctory ana ,ra to 
the problems at hand. One is never able sat ~ractor1ly to 
solve philosoph cal problems by s e l ecti ng only part of the 
data and ignoring the other part . 
Conclus1on8 
With uch a conflict of data and 1nab111ty to find any 
common solution one might wonder what conclusi on can be 
drawn about knowledge. First or all it may be concluded 
t hat pragmati sm URea the empiric l approach. Second! , it 
m y be not d that Dewey in his earlier days was an ideal t 
1'76. Lovejoy, in Prake, Lovejoy, and others, ECR, '76. 
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times 'l!;)ams to ho l?f'Ul1.stio n.nd at other tlm-,~s 1donJ.' ,_tic .. 
Th"' :t;dly, Dr>· ey :t 'l not oartic : arly ·' nt''r'>f3ted 1n enistP-
molog:tcnl :mon sm and dualism but so.:r.e'G:'l.mes seeri's to hold 
to one v1: •r a.nd at o..:;het~ t1r1ea the. other~ Fot!.rthl, ·, tb~I· 
doef! not s~em to be fln.y way of resol "~J5.ng the dil.era.c:a. t.hat 
1·e ·;ey is in e.xc~pt to no to that ., · ey does :not :1eern to be 
c nso~.ous of th pl"oblema ~md that L~evH:nr no ~s not feel that 
he needs t o be systematic . · 
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Chapter VI 
RELATION OF DEWEY'S EP ISTE OLOGY TO CONTEMPORARY THEORI ES 
1. Realism 
Historical background. The term realism has been used 
in t o diff e r ent senses. In its olde r sense i t presents 
the scholastic idea that t he uni vers als have a more real 
existence than the particulars. In t his met aphysical sense, 
t he doctrine can be traced back t Plato. Webs ter defines 
metaphysical r eali sm as 
The doctrine t ha t objects of sense perception L;nd 
hence in extended use, the physical world generallil 
have objective being, independent of mental or psy-
chical faot;--opposed to id alism.l77 
Against thi s i dea or realism, nominalism may be said to be 
a revolt. The early nominalists denied that universals had 
any reality and set forth the idea that the universal was 
merely a name. A synthesis or t he views or nomina ism and 
realism developed is cal l ed conceptualism. This s et forth 
t he i dea th t universals have a degree of r eality but only 
as t hey exist in the mind .l78 This h torio 1 view or real-
ism is not wh t is meant by r eal ism in t his paper. Dr. 
Bright man defines epiatemologic 1 r eal i sm as 
t h doctrine t hat t he object of knowledge is not de-
pendent on ts being known: this may be either monistic 
or du l i s tie . ~pistemological dual ism t s no b 1ng 
advoca ted by t h e school of critical r~alism which sup-
poses t he monism of r ealit y as many ei t h r in quantity 
177 . Webster, ISD, 1778. 
178. Burns in Has t ngs (ed.), ERE ,X, 584. 
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being a are of omething. A di tinction between eensat1ons 
and sense-d ta helps to form t he argument against subject-
ivism. The method used by the new r ealist is no or analy-
s s. s nee modern logic analytical there has been an 
agreement bet eon modern logic and ne real1sm.184 
Ph losoph cal realism rcce _ e s a real timul s from 
the modern logicol analys s or mathematiofl nd mathematical 
advances in the theory or the infinite and continuity. 
While John Dewey was setting forth t he scientific method, 
loF;io w s also be ng dev l oped by A. N. itehead and B. 
Russell. Ru sell points out t h t the un versals which are 
nam d by verbs and propos tions have u ually be n ov rlooked . 
Tha n g ect of preposit one and verbA 1s due to th fact 
t hat in rnotio 1 l:tfe one dwells only n on thoa word in 
a sent nee that stands for particular • Hence ever prepo• 
t on c n be nttr buted to a part of the nglo thing 
rather than xnressing a r lati onshin between t wo or more 
thing . • Thi view 1 Ads to mon1 m hioh is one of the views 
istemologioal moni sm is the view that 
the idea ann th object are one. In th vie of e i temologi-
oal mon sm t he problem of error arises. There is an t tempt 
to solve t his by att mpting to remove error from ense illu-
s1on. l!:rror 1. naat1on but is not r1mar1ly kno ledge 
184. Heat h in Hast ings (ed.), ERE , X, 58~ . 
185. Jourdain in Hast i ngs (ed.), ERE , X, 586-87. 
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and thus cannot form part of the ep1 temology . l86 
There is one ma j or difference bet ween American and 
'ngl ah N o-Rea1tsta. Hodg on. the father of English Neo .. 
Realism, had a~tempt d 1n h i s subject ive anal i of what 
is aetually experienced to r P. ch the real i ty in ace-to-fac 
p~roeption . A thing is what it is kno n as--a real ty in-
dependent of the ex stance of a perceiving conso ouane a. 
Mind is given a statue of ts own character although 1t 1s 
a part of ta objective environment. 1111am Jame , although 
he was not a r alist, was the f ather of American realism. 
Jame taught t ha t thing a re whnt they nr e known to be but 
t hat they need not be known in ord r to be. American r eal• 
ists have accepted James's posit ion of neutral epistemologi-
cal monism lus 1nd pendence. In thA American r e 11~m the 
mind tended to lo. e it l'l pectal status in the order of t hings . 
I n psychology this school moved towa.rda behaviorism hile 
in philosophy tt was extr emely pen-obj ect1vistic.l87 
Neo- Realism is a r e turn to the doctr ine th t there is 
a real objective world as knon directly in pel'cept1on. The 
real objects are directly present 1n t he mind hence the 
theory is monis tic. The mind does.m t create or modify things. 
Relations are ext ernal and objective and are as real as the 
t hings t hemselves.188 
186 . He t hin Ha. tings (ed.), RE ,X, 585 . 
187 . Heath in Bastings (ed . ), ER , X, 585 ; Vergilius 
Ferm in Rune , DOP, 209. 
188. Patrick, I TP , 355-356. 
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2. Critical R lism 
Critical roal1sm arose a a prote s t g movement gainst 
the vi .w of Neo- Realism. The critical r aliat analyzed the 
known situ tio,n carefully and found ifficul ies not only 
1th the old dealistio theories, but also with the r eults 
of Neo-Realism. Some of the outstanding men of Critical 
Realiem are Durant Dr ke, Arthur o. Lovejoy, Jam Bissett 
Pratt, Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, Roy · ood Sellars , 
end 0. A. trong. The most comprehensive book on this view-
poi~t is saavs in Critical Real sm. 
On f the disttnotione bet eon Neo-Realism and Cr it cal 
Reali sm 1s found 1n t he view of the p .rception of objects. 
. _'I1}1e_ cr! ti,cal r e list , do not consider the p roe t ion of ob-
jects t o be as immediate as the ne re lists think. The 
critical r ealists set forth the ide ths t except by infe r ence 
one cannot go b~yond the sense data. The OY'tt cal realist 
1R like the r P list in th .t he rejects 1d lism and eubjecti-
viRm. He accents objective ex1stAnce of things but bases 
this 1pon "f ith" rather t han kno ledge. In this he differs 
from the New Reel st ho accepts t he real1t of the physical 
ob j ects because lrno ledge is the relet onship bet een the 
mind and t he perceived object.l89 
Durant Drake, in hi s es ay on 'The Approach to Critical 
189. P trio , ITP, 357. 
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Realism" (in the volume c ted), po1nts out th t onl the ense 
data are p r sent in experionce an tl ~ t the d t complex 
and reflect the n ture of t he arc iving mind as well as 
the pPrc 1ved object. Sense data are intermediate b tw en 
t he perceiving mind and the h. ioally ex at nt thing. The 
now ng t u t on 1q made up of three kind of ent ties. 
The fir t is the rce1v1ng mind ; the second ts the outer 
object--th qual t1 s no t immed1at ly apprehended in know-
ledge; an the thi rd 1 t~ d tum of perception or tho 
oharact r o mpl x. Th1 . third en ty 1a not ment 1, or any 
oart of the concern n , mind , nor 1s it n as ct of th 
outer object ; it e n intermediate "log o 1 entity," called 
an " ence. n 190 
noth r important di stinction betw en Neo-R 11 m and 
Orit cal Re811s is the r ej ctton on the rt of the Criti-
cal Re 1 at~ of the pi temologioel onism of Neo-Re ism .. 
The Critical Re list denies t h t the mind kn s the object-
tv orld ir ctl but r ther knows b m~ ns of a v hicle 
through h oh one thinks.. Lov joy spe k of th s e istemo-
logic 1 dualism w~en he t a forth a latform for the con-
st nt r gm tist. H t e che th t the cont nta of antici-
pation and r~tro. eotion cannot b a q ign d o t he physical 
worl bu · ~hould be c lled ps chic 1 entities, nd t hat 
190. Patrick, ITP, 358 . 
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of tvlo 1nstincttv --~~umnt on1 nocossr~y 
vt< .. id1 t -y of :::n.owlil -'~? : firr;t , th• t l:nor;l, d:;e 
ts t:t"reur• ti V 0 , EO thn t S0 f -e.x1 tin~~ ttir: G~ r-, _ y b<a-
00!19 ~1~ c' o, en obj ·cts of n ::nd tl at 111 nt, fies an 
1n•~:i o~~tes thGn; seeond, ths tr:not'llodge is ·elovent so 
th .. :~t th' ner i ~d ·on ted na ~- ~Te F"t l !H-'"' ~1 '~le ~ f the 
J l~ q, o1 t' nt tne rind attribut .s to it .. ·-~ ... · · 
for l'"M __ . sn ~ 'l'ha f'1.::t .. ~t :i. the b· olo ~ice.l pl·O",f and fJ•om it 
one r1n·· . .!.o~u'). that the sensuo' s exp i, n i not n i s obj(.'lc., .,19~ 
s n ory exp r"" <.no. i LOt> t " obj~c • !i' t .. ,. \.J, ,..# ch ld 
· ould "H.:;·-in the 1~oon he c.Psi:r•es .. 
·r.'l~ t an object 1s in it intl'"in.,ic ""nd corrlu1:,te 
c'>nsti tutlon v:tl:1 nov r b knmn by - ~m: but t .rt 
t '· s objo(', oxi otis i a kno n sr aoo and t:tr,Et ..... is 
-1 von t.'l ... ')I'l ~"' .0 b gtnning: it is given :ln tho 
f&ct t . t v1r can oint -co 1 t . 194 
1~oac~ ~as ~~ (~en to be id.olist inc rt _n r seat~ 
,holog~ ca_ conclusi n but feels th·~ t nver ·• is [p·~ nto 
191. 
l~J2 .. 
193 .. 
194. 
!.:ovajn:rlll in ~rake , Lovejoy and others, ECR, 76. 
~·n•te:yr>n lf 168 ., 
,u nta.ye.na, 1'70 .. 
('.ntaya a, 172. 
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nclus ·on r o '"'n ' t elt r on.r of t feet un nr b:t lo~ic 1 
p!"O f . lyz tho nsycholor1c~l 
p oa.c. more e ref lll anu ooncln e. thut v n 1 oA1 sts 
n;l. t nl,. of tr th r . ~li<1t cally • 'Lhus -. nt Yt a r'ind a 
r~alist c 1 m nt ~n cl fo 3 of d l s • 'inc t l in-
h .,... n r nlt tic vi w r . ent lP'ld canno- ) , en:to _, t ~en 
one sho 1' a.oc'~ t it n d ny t he vi ;S t h t (::) m to con-
tct it . ~ ug on sh~ul 
n c e ry t) um n h u ht, nc r jec:.. id .:H 1 is , inc "t 1-s 
u rf1c1 1. onJ y · ·y on c n rJ n re~ 1 m eny 
the roa11 t · of 1m • '1 is the 1 od rn t r·s.nscond ntH11 :) t; s 
tt .pt to ·cto . s n t ayo n ho s tl t belief in t im<" i one 
f t e . 'J bGliefs t one h s. i t hout !t on finds he 
cannot J' nt h,:.,. itn s of me o y and mu. nee pt f.! li 
-
• 
195 h· n r gU.tTI n t from t e r .-1 ty 0 time is not 
co. lo·Aly va11 , forD r~onnl~ot1c ide. lis uc Crl -.t-
man 's hns ace t d t.( r ·11t y of t1 e. tl ·"t rd roof is 
the lor1c 1 oroof. From t 1e logical turt\ '"'ant yan de-
cide t h t id 1 conco lnt ion .s realistic . 'hu., ciant oyane 
c ncludo. th t 
know1edcre of s~enc 1s tran. it~v(\, t ermin t d L n 
object r-h1ch is <-plf-deter nined i n its log . cal s here 
end e snent al r l a tions, and may be r~v ale(l to ny 
n:r' nds at different t ime , 1n various contexts, ~:tnd 
wi.th mo or less completene s .196 
195 . Sant. y n , 
19. nta. ana, 
·C , 173-178 . 
c , 183. 
111 
Sant'1~T n ccmclud s th rtioles :i tb tl's Atateruent: 
"You n nnot prove nl i m to a compl te skap uic 01 d~ti.list; 
al?-r->""tin o~<> ~1 c'~ ... '1., t but: ... "'"e nl ... t ·"- 'r1"' 0 "'."t . U.97 ? ..... __ )" .. ~-!~".trrn_,_ ""··'-"' ,- U '-' ~ ! ·, <:l,_- J ~ ..-~ .. d. 0 ' 1.. '0 ...,... . o I ; . j - _ G 
· na mor ~x·oof o:f cr tics ..... rnal 'i_ !i is cal:--: en from t A 
r ifficnl'ty t;h· t nr:isa " "~.n this vi w 1 is oftr-,n 1"' joc~~~d. 
dual· sm "s an 1nhn.rHnt ns.r. t of c. 1t1cnl :!."tlnl_. sm tho n~·gum~nt 
f'l"Onl "'rror 1" v _. ed for a ,-.oof o cr"~ t!c·l r r>u ll. ;n .. ~- 98 
5 .. Jct-
197 8 ~')antHya.nn , 1J;'CH., 184 .. 
198 .. ·rl.,h·r9an , I':l: , 91 ; Ro:er 11 EGn 149-160 . 
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1rre ... onc11nlly opt'O~ d to eac·. o ,. r 't; nt one muAt c o > • 
n . a hAVe tri d tr r~v )~t 2 
l1Rm and · Aal1sm . 
d al1sm 1 a th..., ph lor,_ oh1 cal 
poq1 t .. or. tha" . lnd or co .. sci.ou ne 
r 1 t•OL .o .h. m1nd ,. l 39 
i :1 to be jl st nn opne arancG nd rrd.nd ulor... is 
.. 1. •l .. Or. a n nti ve point of v_e.. one rni ~.~:.:.t y that 
1 d ,-1 L..~:n :!. l A o.posi a of meter eli t . As tv be n found 
tx·ue :in renl ·' s , o.l tho ' h thar , I ffo~ont tv ~,_ t q o 
no 
Fund am ~!Jl h' 
.... 
""he ··;}ole, id. li m ly uro of t·.a s .rnop ic J. 
:n -h.c is l!bl- t ... ,!', s a full :r p 'CU:t" of !'P,lit., ., ~ e 
t'loAt impo . t .. t nd 1nc1 ive ·no -~ found in exn r1f'nce 9 
consc1 doallsn a le to bP rnpiric 1 in it 
cons·d 'io1 f h 1ind or ~f ccn-cic sn .~ . '.!. hr fl e queo -
tons f c- t~ ~hiloso hGr . a t t 
give n , e.xp-r1once'? h t doe t ho thinl'er xo c ~ t ett · r 
1 y n o. icAl .lnbo:· n -1on of tt ~ giv ,n? htt t t ituda io t o 
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ate. t at 
:1~ .li ra 1~1pl:'las .J·mt t:o rel.tion of subJect s.nd 
obj · ot i:1 on nf ,h- as.santi ,l ~ al~t·' n -po ~· t · of 
philo ophy, end :tn 1t'1 vte o th.t r 1<-•tion it. · 
laya do·m t r- d e:sive nrlnc .. lt? t;v ooJectfl can 
e.x t on J;r for " ... su.b.i ct.~~ ~c>nc th!ilt tr.o subjeo 
vhloh CDl""!'l. ,:q tl.l object ~ '~"'· l--in t"1olf 1 ·. f' h:" gh•n• 
Ct.t~gory ,. a ld as IJUCb mu,.t r . f'. · inn the "'~l~OOOSS 
of' ... ~ ilosonh cal +-hought. ~OO 
r 'CO · ro _nct ~ s n t a. school of dei'in1 t f:l:xed id.:l~. s.. ThL .. 
·h~ fundament tl ~o itio .. s 
"~e old st ide l.at~c e~st m ~L 
tta.t of J _ to . ~There is, ..., rno t imnortont oue.ti.on as 
to t e oo .,.....,ct int ... :t>p ctr ::.on n:f Plato one · •11 fin in 
Pl.: to f ,.:r-v t1ngs trnt hf' AP k. or t .L~ hl"i"\ 1 n t lLn s ln· .. the 
·orld n "'·be qees~-ete nnl Gs~onces 11 form or t·· .:>H~ . 20l 
t 1-; 
,}; p 
n r cn"1· oi ·y o.P ,.,. rt::"..n.r eonce. t.s ( ·V ·lops_. 
by recollect4 ot • 'lhis f~cu'It~r Aoe~ n'1t-' flf·tse 
·~ . ~.... , l:t y t.1 g nr- ~d; .d only 
20~· . IJ.':eo ltoch .. n ~h~ sti:u.gs (e<.) ~ .. /~~~ , ;!I, 90. 
~ 1. ~atria: , I~u~ 213. 
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br :roce~!J of t ot '(lu 'ov rn d y autono~ o q 1 rlor1 
r.tno~nl s . ~ 0 t:lJJ n 1''P, om ·v. c~ma id lOd ti!iS 
v1eq tr. b rARli ~.-- - •br:;, n 1 of t e v ri le r P.l. ' 
' by J"Pfltl <! of c no 3. .· ~iA fo_ of 1< J1em P.t 
n os t '01, from nom.inul ~ ... 1 - c n· r c 1 1 2 
o of. .... d ali m. 1 ul jeot VG d 1.~ sm. 
eor o ~e_! l oy 1 l.e ' 1 di ng e . on t of t,b·. vie • 
.tort r· ;. t. .r . .xi . g aport· froi:l our er ... f't t on .. n ;·t<: , y ' s 
' ( ,, 
.I.OUc:t "- to uP. to b, noroo•vqd ~··A e<t r ;.n• ... ,nl) . -
t:r or r1 nl sm t(l(\ h. ~ t w. n on .. s R t .t l 
iL :-ri. t,Cf l"'' tl •• it p ec I o:ne tr"'~ 3 1, • 
to thin of n obj .~ •\J a not b i..n p ro 'lvec be 
t nl..:ll'l' of :t'·, nd t hu., ·.t r . ins e. t OU[:,ht ob'] ct . 
vi.o · of ic !'1..1~ ... c,~ nt :rrolo~e :tcal r-.-.. ... e ~3t . ( 1i.srn • .c Jv 
A -f:' id~ 11-,T'l 1 h( 
id ~11am or Cl1f, o 1 i· 1 .. 
in lu tr,c ur of i.tq on 
n y 1 rge ?1'11' ... .. uro 
det • .y . ::1 • t cturo . ~ o leading cl r .:- cte ; I.· c 
(l)t.LI" 
fnc "- of cn'l 
pr ri P 
flG<"'l . 
200? . 
v n f'orr• t1 on of tr e 
r · 1 no ·lo L by .t 
Uf 
ERE , VIT, 91 . 
115 
{2) the limitation of the validity of this trans-
formation to the actual data of experience , and the 
application or the cate ories to a reality beyond 
experiencc . 204 
Kant differs from Berkeley in that he does not deny 
some objective reality back of phenomena . The round for 
sons at ions is found in the Ding an s ich (thin-in-itself) • 
One can never know the world as it is but only as it appears 
to be. Thus Kantian philosophy is not the extreme ideal-
istic vi w that finds nothing real in the world except mind , 
but yet it is still mainly idealistic . Kant ' s epistemology 
can be developed into either an epistemological monisn. or 
205 
dualism. 
'till another kind of idealism is absolute idealism. 
One of the greatest men in this school of thought was Hegel • 
.; .. .. 
Since it ms found that truth \7B.S one coherent system it 
was conside~ed just as logical to find reality as one coherent 
:-.-. 
system. The universe shovm both independence and unity ~ 
The only thing that man knows anything about that shows both 
independence and unity is mind . Hence the universe is one 
all-inclusive , a.ll-explainin 1 wholly rational mind .. Another 
monism. It is admitted that ordinary thought seems to show 
204 . Troeltscb in Hastings (ed.), ERE , VII , 92 . 
205 . PatricK, ITP , 220, 22 . 
•t ."J. 
...... L. 
i a n~ B t:ttoy• t .e 
n 
h " o .1 ct ~ nr' t t n v ryt'·.1 rw 
J r·ence . lf n a , 1 ·- Xl':l r1e.nc 1 
"ilOil q t; c vie· of 
; ht < • ~ 
fo::mu ( t 1.•· f!l':} 0. 1 11 ~ nn . 0; CO & trl! OI r:r n i'~rm 
n lt n d h . ., • \r»pr en ;at l.V "~:r-
vi le s tomo. 
ln t e 
Tt is q 1 1:tnt ve rronis 
ln l! ... 11 n -t . c1 !.J d is l ;'··al.i.nt·· c 1 moro 
. ' n one :ln R lit.' 1 9oo!ety o~ .:tH on. an< t'.'er i .,. .. ~ 
one 'U!Jl'$ pe.1.uon 1n nnd fo :r- 7LOSA _,_hc,u h t • nc "'Ll tll 
X 80 . 'l t "'"boy aro no hing p l't f '0 h m 
, cor L n t ... 11 t .. ax-e is,~~ Ol" hu: an 
• 0 no ... v r ')Or' • • ,J , 
m st nngo to some to b con-
m in ro t on for 
co s of J hn D e y . I boul<· be 
207 . 
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not. 
" 
t 'II ~ s on 'Y on men n t,.~ pr tic 
c onl Pnd t . t b fl."1} John _ J 0~ bnc 
A ·pra at • Pr :rn ~ . ·. ·~~ u :tn 1 98 
irt t of ,.111.. J c tJ " h1lo~ouh; r.. 
Concontlon t c R 91lt • :19. cores t"'ro .1 
, 
t G e~ ~ ·o1 .. ~f7DlY.HDt C''. ct on). 
r 0. ,n ~m 1n tr ~ a ~.~r· t e ryth n -c, t ()n 
09 0 b lr "' nd ult· ~ ely 
l0gica volue. .:r ( - ·e n J 
t . il () 1 obl .11 • 
0 On . . d a cri-
.tion fQ'lr d is in:r r· fl"' rdn 
-
1 · s D "rag··· tism g1 vas tho ns · . o lom of maa.nin · 
y ( t5n _ort~ t~ a id t t e n u n npl1-
· n~ .. 1- cable nr"lt1o to ·he 
• con .-L lo 0 ~ ca. p 0 let th t 
p nt n r.. r for 9 t -G ro 1 r.1 of t - h. r t 
cla. m 1s II ola . ' d to b r ru h is ·1 tiv to J.. • 
th .tnt raf 1 !d. no nb · ol G ru h can tv t 
"i"'sh • Truth at b u l d 1 v-r1f d by t e xn :rta . 
' rt th cannot ~ ol th r t n a no furt· er 
v r:1f1c t on . 20 
h1lo oph1c 1 roblern h t r ti... : d P 
ith s t nrobl . f trut nd rror. T~e reg nti t 
J ~x, 140-148. 
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0( n ~ -'lo:..· · oth t. uth ann 'rr r to ~ value a.. mhor ~ n. 
bsoltte c er:to. for tr11th nor ny c rtnin ~alic, roof 
hich An .r t~ eonol s on!=t f'ect. fnurth 
psyoh.lo icf'l t o lo :- c . h s fot,nd a 
r 1 re. at e+- e.n logo 
·ructurB of tl ou m; lmd 
1"1 ha i rtad lnto 
0 t t t.~~ ... ,h y 1 
~ ~t1 g t ~ corr ~ on· no · tw~-n t .e obj c. en ·t i kno 
nd th object e.s 1.t r--all 1s. ':le ide 1 ot.tG co1crenc 
heo:r>y is rejected b cnu ong o nnot po tulat a1 )oO-
lt · ~lY co ,. n · , t m of truth u on t" e v d ... '1C of the 
rsl t v,ly oh--ont ystem oft sci noe , nnd b c u ~ on 
is not ,~.. find · b ol .tel co ·ent tl: th in an lJ n 
mind. o uch nbsolut 1 predio l • frngmati m r-J ct 
both the e vi and pren~.c t a v1e of truth rPlativa to 
Irt n . 209 
ry of Phil terns 
hown tho d1.t nct1v featur or onoh 
p ilosonl'lte 1 s m, the next t a s k i s to um"'a riz nnd 
ln H t n.g • ;'RE ... • 118-150. 
1.19 
analyze their teao ing. in .·~ e.t~( n to th teachin~: of 
_oci'J. se.,ool of :- hilo. onhy t cl. s o.hou e, ch p:N'ibl~m This 
a d gtves e co:rrrp ot.o vi ·'• Tl o 
conoludQd th t nsyohology an .. c logic - a"" the ~Lthod of 
pbilOSO'Phy r.1l1, t 0 nv. l'"ll itself ith the "'tUdy Of eA'tJP?iGUCE! a 
'rhus t S" ch loc:,v~ givn tha ds.t'm f r ph.lo oph:1c 1 in rest1-
ge.t1on.. £"!<"J peychologioo.l .:. ronch to ph losonhy Wd$ link d 
st ... ll hne ~m rnnorte.nt lnflu~nc upon t.is 
!u. a1:t '"·m 11n. · ~:tl:: ... i ""'s ~! , rtL-'~.,., point 
to • C'\ ISVC . . logical appronc1 to ph:ilosonhy .. 
wey l""ecogn1.zed t!:<L by his li~ ,:1.ng toget.J ott id"· lisr;"1 nnd 
P- lo~ . y., Tn •. t€l ii.d of u ne the 
p ych lo . c 1 ''i'.)!)I'oach , 1 t is c, nc !'ned .1. ... h a vi w o:f th 
120 
wholo )f G:h.-pryr•1enoa. It t oke :1 ~ s t arting point ln 
com~o · .ouRm9,_ s :z-~th r than in thr"! ct ona of men. 
3 .. Rosl1 sm. The mrrpha . is of r alism 1et upon nature 
eo the total r43.,.1lity .. lJ.~he boJ..lef th. t th:i.G re,.l.tty exlsts 
1nd~p .nfl..:•nt of mind .. 0 lld rmf11ct ·ith thg psycholop:icnl 
approach to philosonhy. This psyc ol gical approach vmuld 
r etion._ m~tho r athor thnn tbe emplrica.l method but ccep ts 
th~ data fro:t!'l th emp"i rical anpronch . 
1 . 
tried .o dAvelon e. p'iychologlca:i approaol to logic but fou.rA 
~- e logic but 1-lt that th.e ge \are not con:plote b tnem-
.,.:-.,· 
elv a . He P111ph s1.zed the h-f'Al an 1do n. of, r.jl~greso ln his 
i 
UO\V lo...,ical t 'H~Orioc., l\lon~ v;1 th th:L h", .df1Veloped t he 
sc1entif1c mat,oc . Tris scientific metod includeo. (1) 
felt diff5.c 1lt y , (2) its locat~on anr def1n .. t!on, · (~-5) sug-
~ stions of noss le solutions~ (4} d v lopment Dy rgnson-
i.n.g of the b nrinss of the SU!':l' e<Jt iono nnd then ( b} 1'11rth11r 
ob~Arvet on ~nd Vf-)l'iflce.t. , n nnd or .t1oal t',ougbt . '1-he 
ttc" .nt fie method is rima.11y a m.th of analysis . J vey 
121 
ruth. 
2 .. lft_oliam . Id alia oono df.l"R the laif•· of logie 
to ~ ~ nar of h 
abl • IdBR! 1 ~ l 
~:~ynon. ts ., fJ.'he er!' 
l P 11 Str! f·rom 
1 • h 
n t ... od o_ an. l:m:t. 11 S)fl1tl-"~~eia" Ell'ld 
upon t h s,no~tic m~tlo~ d sting hen 
~t t:J!'(.I:'leh . Idenl:tsm l'~eognj.z s forme.l logic, 't ducti 1.~e 
lo ,:tc and ··he vc.;1· di .; of t e C!I! Q nt1fio m .tho·~ in .... ci-
ont•fic s"tuation • 
• ~1lJ'.s ,1"' b~ d5a: ssad in a tUff' 1~ t soc.~'.on . Hi·-: t_h r 
e.jor ob .jeo 'i~n... to eV'eyt. logio S!'"'~ ~o baso on , b1.- t 
r wrn .. :Jid a~ MttnL a~ they aro basad or .•hull" he dian 1 dis .. 
c• s ... B .rt:rnncl Huaa ll a. ks how on ea kn w th :r . :ls . n 
unlm bl ~ !' f only fini bed pi"" et a arc kno ·n .. ,11 so nd 
bject ion !s tr :·t. D-ewe-: ' s v ie 'I of no l'lGd ·o }'\..as no pa s1v 
connotation . ~L t hird obje c _o 1s to the over•e. pl. s1s 
of tJ.a pr aet.csl ole. -O ert~and Rue oll aot1v ty ia 
or.uy one hnlf of ~iado -~tha other poPt r ests 'pon n tv 
l'~>GCe t iv1t • 
'111 
......... d Iii 
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mount of good and ev. 1 nay b~ o ~ np~d~ 
Hum n (, fforts c n 1rr.r.n"'OVo the · or1<3.., 
2 .. Jol:l.n De' y-... nen as :!'rf e v 1 1 bt t r0co .... 
niz, s a dee 1 :toe for f:res ao c ety .. ·;:- 11 s 
R t1onr 11. ty de:r:mn& th t man e frae. k~an 
con nak olto'! cee . 1 111 is the ~Xt£rci 0 of 
c .. e' freedo:n a a :ln. t an obs a el<h 
!"e ,~ · t of biologio · 1 roo !'! e~ tn the bod-y' end 
a:t• cet:;nrniued . Free wil l do o .. m t ex .st in 
this rn_ch n s tc vi 
• 
.. r gnati sm .. - knonledg 1a obtained t .rough ex-
perieno . .. By-e~ eri nee_ v.s are ols.rifi-d 
' 1J:it. 0 
explain natu~ and lets rmn 
X'fL· d t hf3 t lOUeht or thC' 5.nf1nitE1.. Kno···l~dg 
co. ~l from empi:r•ical urooes .., e. • ~·ind :!~ nble 
f kn.o•·le ee wbl ch is tl e eff et on thf3 body of 
st1nn:tli .from the natural orld . 
a ,; Neo-RPalism-... " en know reality an i t 1s ,. 
--....;;;;o;;;,o;;;;,,;;:;,;;;o; 
d eply .ith tho roblam of e i. tamologieal 
rnm.lmn an d dual1am. t t1:mo:s h tal-tes 
mm !~;tie vi~ and at times flu lj. st1c .. 'fh r 
:te ~~ re on bl d r e of uno rt 1nty -s to 
D :ey' pos tion tn this problo • He con-
i d;:.rs thla a o oudo problem. 
Ji 
.. ld aJ~--Idealism nm.y be ep s temolog cal ly 
eithnr monistic or du listie . l or this rea on 
n d)£1nite distinct on can b dr n b tween 
D ey' position nd Pall !I on t !iS point . 
•robler" b1 e not baon dlsc'\Jssod 1n this the~1.~ "ec· n~e they 
Uetuoh~1aios 
an us • 1ntelllgonce to in eract 
\:ritb 1 .::.a onviromuant . The e is only finite 
nature. 
!l . 1:<.: mlis·:-··'l'ho1•e ·a a enevolont God •·;.bCl is th 
--
h d3 s a:.le cont:rol ov 1 nnture .. 
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.;;.;:;:.;;;.;.;;;;:.....:.:;,;;.;.;,;;;.....,;;;;...;0;..;!!'! • 
Sa f . 
.P .. P aJmati~m ... - Bod:v is the in trum n al1. y of the 
the )ody ., 
tet. united to bn y b;r ea: s an offect . £1ind 
and body o 
th tho bo y nd pu.r-
pc.saful . EY.:J y mok no d1st 1 ot:ton bt1tween 
th ""elf and the body. 0 ~ may Sl ak of' ithe r 
self OI> body--the f'nnot':!.on are t hG s me. 
B. Id nlism--The SGlf 
-==;;.;; t! · fin!to nart of th 
infinite .. SomG id alist ould ma <e a i.s ... 
tinction bet aen tte f1n1t e lves nd t he in-
f1n1·"'e . Th .;;:; via• ''ould hold to e plnr .d .ty of 
1ndiv1du 1 selv s . 'lhe a l f i s t e con ci.ous ... 
n. as--the th!nld.ng, ,.,a.nt!ng , o tghtine~ d airing , 
ill n p noipl • 
c. B__l!_m- - lf is t .a .ontal 11f resul~ ng 
A . 
B. 
c. 
A . 
.fro t.h re otion of o 
(! "'e •tlt of bio-c .Jlnic 1 rn~-
n tL nrl.vidu 1 . ntin.r , 
w 11in~t ou-hting, a.nd de re-
act ons of C.t emie-1 roc ·1o ·• 
~'1" J!:!':".a.t:tsm ... - Fr m th •or a 11 ty .d 11 , tru-
ent lit f 1 ns 1~o 1 et n<. .. s 
ror .. ruth. Both co erenc nnd corr sncnd nc 
ar rajoctpd nd v· of r lflt1 e tr th 1 
ld . 
Idonlism ... - coh rene of idP e 1th 
t. 0 ht truth. y cohe~ no - an ~(oa u.t 
not on!y co~r pond 1th th ob or da. tun 
bu the 1 e us not b e in o nflict h 
o h r qually v nl1 ide s . 
m- -Th'-7 rel ..,ion of corr non . nc ·. of 
_.......,..== 
i th fnc-c 1 truth. J.: 1e co r s ond nc 
t. ory attempt t o t n truth by :tta ngrtH>-
~ n w1 tl r 1 ty. 
dju .. Gnt i 
12? 
:P. • 
·, no~ mrknble. 
the A.lu · of g 0d or ovil . ~'.t n' c · <Y" nl!l of 
o t idr-~ li..· 'l'l om >ha-
a - Z~Il)S thnt ono of n: nt s innate a btl it1 ,Q J s 1i 
do morG than t e Vl"f.gnatL t or idea 1 't t .. 
·Gither ~ood nor 
evi: • bu+ mo1'l enn unfold som rn:yateri !' of n -
goodnoo . r1 ~y . 
A., 
that · ~ ho11. of thp t n s -
co:nd. nt \""'orld m "T b ; us o if 1 ., orit'1 o; elJ.., 
' , t(;.s that it c .nn t bo us d b~<!S' o '1 t G( o. not 
c. ~ftlrs~-- ~n can t vo no kno~vledge of c~od o :he 
rcc.l ~!. ·t. .t ea of religion end racoenizes ton:pore.l 
v lu•~s only.. ::;onJ.O · oalism has been t heistic, hm'1-
ovc;.r,. 
In Jew .;11 ~ oal"ly ph losoohicnl dev lo mont he wa~ an 
absolut .st . Hf} rnn1ntnJ n d some of h a td alistie 
tondencios but hla le.tor philosonhy sho~ed a trend away from 
idealism. De ey ' 13 later p l a. tic viei: was not en ::l.d .al-
1 tic or roa st1 ~~ philo o by , but r thor an t- 1pt to 
aynthesiz th e ·~riews . De' oy' s pragmatic view bac0rne a 
new philo o hy di:f'fe:rent fro bo ..... h :real'! am . nd ide 1ism. 
6 '3rm1~:pent Contributiono of Pragmati.am 
.any feel th1at ' (!/<l'lay ha sho that many ab tract 
tarms ~:mch a . cnnl3epts, idoa.s, syllogism , tho~ht , and 
i mo.g ns.t1on aro mf?rely r otical in t , ants fot> solving 
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probl rns . If on g1~ . nt~ 1 d · , syllog1. • 
a d tho ht r :m r in tr ontFJ , tHm you 
• hi thesis h 8 ho tb 
-"nee it is cn 1nt . ie 
" 
kt •1nf! 1 a 1ntr1.n 1c 
v lu, cone ots re r too s . • ome b ve fe 
, t in do nr! t,· l 0 hy OI: 1-;h1 .. . t t 
oa~ b und~r oo b:v of he 
..:... trnn1 for ·~ o ion 
is of p "~C rUne ~y 0 oy . fo t cd 1;}-; a 8 trf\n( . 
r.:o ot erCJ t.. • i t ud .nc, to old te!'m in flAi l ay 
t comp "1~on. t;.1' is '3 's lac'· of sv .t"'' ti7. 
-
i:: on MR ': h· book VGr; hn l:" lin~ . 
Pr. tgmat" :~ .. s d "nct pA c en r·o bv t 
t 1tuda of op~~-Lindo IJ h~ bo 
fr ~ om nd pl st~ e· t f t . iugh ~n h. one crit-
leis .... 00 pt.d . f ... Pd r d he.s 1 d to grry th de-
v-lop~r 1n b t 191 u.ncer tan~ o tn.- tth. ·no 
.. lo~ g to n -
d~ nd~nce of th .ght. 
ougl t .. 
co,. r1but·ons f pipreb r -
si' -ne. un 1t e -nden e on exu r1ouo .. It dor:s 1, a.y 
1th b con t:ton of lm1: hi lo, oph tt. .,..nd 1nste,-.d or .. 
nts otur ()f' n - kt ' fo .. r sul ' . .. p_ '@r1 tJ 
1 ~ ph lo~onhy of c~lor n .c r 
0 -~r to f'nets.. r--: 'lt nr. 
Ot 1er nm :or eo tr'i.bution· 
b .1 v ~ that ·} e sc!.on .f c otho CO'L_J.d 1. 
"'v ry i .d t rm.~ .at Th l!l..'>St :lnd t r , tnat 
oe.n k ow . yt~ ng ab t •r ._.ocie.l 
I 
I 
e me roc of a '!"t:)U._h to t..h soc 
roble.. cf th day n ha 1 ~ e great cent:> b tlon in 
the field Of wOC l thought . 
Th other g1•eat con~--l~lbu !o aloo came from lio ey1 a 
ep st r"ology. 'l'l i is De y ' b contribution in the field 
o education. Ho hnd found d cat on bol'ing a a child 
and set out ~o ~-ke ducation1 a living vital thing rather 
thnn or11 thing t nd stat e . ·e applied th sci.entific 
method to education nd emph aized the ne d of activity 
in .l oarn g . .,. wey a ~dncat .. r)nnl vL.ws todr r kno.n 
a.;.. r zr ~ 1 ve a-lucation . 
0 thiag ,ha t .~ oy c~s is _ h gh -d .nl rr • 
h· m ny -",h 1.d -als ... n oc1all t.ou~:r. rut n 0:1 d .t-
l 
ini t idee... De· . y sets fo·•th hG denls of ... onstan pl"og-
ress, advanc n~m ~, .p rov rnen~, 1•• of ~eurc _in of .... he 
trt.th . The ~-d~ala empha. · ze trlv1ng but 0o not g_ve the 
ower to c rry u a tr.v1 ' • ~his po G. can only~)~ 
from a b~l1ef in "' htgh i de 1L m.. 'lhe:r·<n if! no· a ~J.l.fflc:l.fmt 
omphf;l. 3' "l u.p ' ·· zoul .. t:~w~y 
·~~ .. . ..
<;.Yilination o f our demnnds .. Int-!ll!g e.nce ·.s to be a glJ.hle 
,. 
is, . no ona ':cnows . Dewoy t s rnnny goals but no .Q!!.~: go&l of 
llf~.. Th:ls laek of an incltts!v.; teleologloal a.ap ct is 
the future, but by the nature oi' lis pos ition he can never 
ah:ow what ia invo~jted in h ·t s view of the fut;urae l=<.y hts 
.::·;_rid:L. 
rn ha. 1 ~ 1;1non many goa_ls t bo uni t, of 'l")tl.rpose tb:n t ~: single 
goal caul givA·i~ lo~ t . 
D~\-:oy ' ~ matr~od of tl"uth cannot be us~d in all sl t. -
u. .tions e• r;,r .. ~)!' ghtrna atate that Hit is ikLO diiilcul 
to .se~ hov .n:r h:lolog1cal ac justmont of a,..~ organi .. m 'to 
lts 4 viro:nr.t nt ean tos t a on-b1 logil.}el fnct l:tke self· 
eonsc1 ousrie .s . tl210 · The cri tori on of truth tho pr8grr2.t1.st 
used is too narrc~ ·' • B,,. mean~ of 1 t e...l"'l~~ching • orknble c :1n 
be t ccoptod n3 true ~ Tr.is basis of WOl .. kabil ty is ·-uo brond. 
Another objection that may be l. .. aised to Dewwv, :ts his u.nwill ... 
1n.gnsss to e bound to systematic thougLt. If n .· refus s to 
b.o.ld tc sy':ltematl c t h ought, he may hold to cont::Pfldicto:cy 
1dea a .· If a p e rl?on accepts a ntradictory ideas and f ela no 
' ).32 
comr>llnion to b9 rational, thought b-eemeR impossible. : 
~~on elusion 
__.;,........,;;..;;;.;..;;.;.<-
!r ... onclu. iou -1 t rna bo atated that Yragrontism ha '-:! 
:ntad~ eo !10 reol contr:tbt:~..tions to the t . eol: . of. knowl(J!igl3~ 
12bn statement of ·he sct~nt f o m~thod, th E"nphe.eis 
~;,pon p:racti cal r{~sul ts, . the en1pt1'~ical a!'tprosch to knov 1-
~.dgt:), the a pl1ct;.ticn of the · c1antif:tc method to soc ~.al 
ph1losonhy, and ~~ducation are some of its msin cont:rtbu-
doe"~ not solve nor even devl lith all the p ·~oblems of 
epistemology., Ono should realize that Dewey hns uulde 
SOme rr•'ll c.ontr:tbutions to the V:leWS Of lrnov•lOdgA S.D'.~ &CCSpt 
these, but thts do0s not involvo e. b11.nc' ac .~r.p . nee \>f all 
_..;,.; ................ ~ 
1.'o summo. r z thi .!" th t it 11 b adv s blo to 
f llow t he c 1 pt.er hood· nnd ~ e ho.! ns • id tt'1 '?1' o _ 
•jro _ch to t probl m of th·· E)i..temolo y of John ... e•·cy 
o1ld not b i t net. L1 'tOl"ical .or vould o cl ,.obl m 
b" dov lop. d com. 1 telv, res;a.:rdl a of !.. .• s r1:lc t . n to the 
o bG r probl ms f api. tc olot;,Y. ach probl m a a con-
1 or r £.9 .... f r t appe red , histor-y ttld th n the de-
velopm nt of the ·~oblem ·ao traced ~o modern ti~e. 
~he first major pro lam that De y conaidored s the 
relationsh n of ~ychology to p· loso hy. In hi earlier 
dnys he linlcGd th psychological a.ppl'oncl to de li • 
7 attempt d to interpret a 1 ph~loaonhy ln tho llgh~ 
of psycnology. Tl:> Do!! y p ychology as the only obj ctiv 
st dy of .. erien·..., nnd D oy de ired to dev lop an em-
piricnl phil sonhy. t the present time e ley ha reject d 
the p ycholo !cal a roach but s ill r tn1ns the omoiric 1 
thod of 11o-l hy. 
The n xt problom that arose as that of logic. ewey 
hnd tried o d velop n p ycholog ioal a pro ch to 1 gic out 
found th a 1 . oo 1ble . H thon ace 11ted both formal nd 
in uctiv lo lc but f lt that them wor not corn 1 t by 
... hems lv • e e:.p 1z d tb Hegelian ~d of progr s in 
hi new logical theorie • long 1th thi h develon the 
. f1 .. :m od. Th:t c1 .nt1 1 ... 
an J y l I! anu. c udes flve . t ps. ·he .e re 1} 
. 
e. fol di u.lt,y, (2) t loc• t1on and definition, (.3) 
s g "'tlo o~ pos~ibla qolutlon , (4) devalopme t by rea-
tl~ b~l inga of t tio s, and ~h n (5} 
> 
fa:rt va ; ol)snrv tlon an e~-f.ontion . Truth m y. be round 
by publ:te ver r: eat. on . 
fp _y then go to the pro l em of thoucht. .Ile . no·~ 
soV6r!c1l d1 ff. ;:~l· r~nt t rpe of t ho wht and teaches that t;ha 
.11 host e is rooll'1ec ive thoue;ht.. lron refl ctivo th•)Ug t 
1. goes iuto the problo . oi' jud&T.lont . F~ di scus. ea w.i· t 
they ar 3 .1o.,. th y are fOl'med, and hen t h y ro v~ llc. ;;. e 
d1.scus sion of the validity 0 jucgm.ent l e ds to the study 
of t"te n tut-e of truth • 
• h n xt chapter considered a on t1e r attre a1 
tht:Jory of kno ledge. mhis problem ·as tl'ecod out in it. 
historical etting. l n vhe p roblom of tho rc>lation~hlp 
of 1 oo.lis .. end zoaal1s.., to Do~ey' s on t hou ;ht aro e . oth 
i deal s tic and re 1 stic t r onds w r foun in D ey's t hought . 
The probl em of monism and r elism lso aroso and 1t 1aa 
seen thet l e- y' a po i t ion could not bo olearly sce1·t ln d . 
After thi t he rel t ionship b t een prag ti m, id ollsm, 
and r lisn as discussed. :agm~ ~ism ~~s d~a u from ~eal-
1s · enC' i deal· am hut l-Jas d veloped these d€ ·a in a i o r~ny. 
Co. an:v ~ 6 (1.)00 1, 32 -323., 
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